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 ABSTRACT 
 
Over the last four decades, there have been many catastrophic oil spills in the 
marine environment and these larger oil spills have often caused environmental 
devastation especially if they occurred in the coastal marine area.   Serious 
ecological damage can also be caused from operational discharges, ballast and 
bilge water, from ships within territorial waters.  Until now New Zealand has only 
had relatively minor oil spillages in its coastal waters, primarily from ships’ 
discharge or accidental leaks in port.   The possibility however of a major oil spill 
occurring within our coastal area is considerably higher today than 20 years ago 
as there has been a significant increase of all types of oil tankers/bulk 
carriers/container ships to New Zealand.   
 
New Zealand is an island nation that relies heavily on the marine environment for 
commercial operations such as fisheries and tourism and many New Zealanders 
enjoy recreational, aesthetic and spiritual ties to the coastal marine area.  The 
sustainability of our territorial sea is therefore of paramount importance.  A major 
oil spill could cause widespread ecological damage, cripple or destroy 
marine/tourism operations and ensure that the human values associated with the 
coast are lost, possibly for many years.  The research reported here addresses the 
issue of oil spill preparedness and response in New Zealand’s waters.  A 
combination of a review of New Zealand’s international commitments and 
domestic legislation and two case studies of high profile oil spills: the Poor 
Knights Islands Marine Reserve and the Jody F Millennium are used.   The 
research identifies whether the present environmental legislation, that promotes 
sustainable management, is proactive in the prevention of a major oil spill and 
concludes that the New Zealand approach reflects a relatively strong Sustainable 
Imperative position rather than one of Sustainable Development.  In 
implementation it relies heavily on co-management integrated at the regional 
council level.   
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Oil is the life blood of our modern industrial society.  It fuels the 
machines and lubricates the wheels of the world’s production.   
However, when that vital resource is out of control, it can destroy 
marine life and devastate the environment and economy of an entire 
region … (Max, 1969 citied in Aynechi, 2004 1). 
 
The above quote could have been written yesterday instead of over 30 years ago, 
as it is just as relevant today.  Oil continues to be the life blood of the modern 
world and the demand for it is increasing.  Consequently, the marine 
transportation of it has also been amplified and this is demonstrated by the 
available figures, produced by the International Tanker Owners Pollution 
Federation (ITOPF) (2004), which show that in the 1990s over 7000 oil tankers 
transported more than 1.5 billion tonnes of crude oil/oil products.  This escalation 
of oil tanker traffic has ensured that the proclivity for oil spills in the marine 
environment continues to be a great threat. 
 
According to Doerffer (1992) a major oil spill is one that is 700 tonnes or larger, 
while a minor oil spill is below seven tonnes, thus a medium oil spill is anything 
in between.  Most minor marine oil spills, as they occur fairly frequently, are not 
reported beyond the country they occur in.  This also appears to be the case for 
many medium-sized oil spills and may be due to a variety of factors such as; the 
amount spilt, whether the spill is in a significant/sensitive ecological habitat or 
that the oil spill was quickly contained and/or cleaned up.  Hence, it is often only 
the major oil spills (>700 tonnes) that receive international media attention. 
 
The first such major oil spill from an oil tanker, to be given worldwide coverage, 
occurred in March 1967 with the grounding of the ‘Torrey Canyon’ on Pollard’s 
Rock in the Seven Stones reef between the Scilly Isles and Land’s End, England.  
The tanker leaked approximately 119,000 tonnes of crude oil into the marine 
environment, devastating the coastal marine area (Draffen, 2004; Petrow, 1968; 
Smithsonian Institute, 2004).  
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Sadly the ‘Torrey Canyon’ was not the largest oil spill to have eventuated.          
Records differ regarding both the number and size of the major oil spills that have 
happened since.  For example, according to The Mariner Group (2006) only seven 
major spills occurred in the 1970s while the ITOPF (2004) recorded 252 oil spills 
greater than 700 tonnes during that period.  The ITOPF also state that the number 
of major oil spills has dramatically lessened throughout the 1990s and into the 
21st century.  There are various reasons for this reduction that ranges from 
enhanced navigational technology to double hulled tankers.  The essential 
component that aided the decrease of major oil spills nevertheless, was the nearly 
universal acceptance of ‘sustainability’ of the oceans.  This has ensured that many 
maritime nations, including New Zealand, have ratified international, regional 
and/or bilateral agreements and implemented domestic laws regarding the 
transportation of all oil products (Doerffer, 1992; ITOPF, 2004).   
 
Despite the fact that larger oil spills have lessened in recent years, they still 
happen.  An example is the 10,000 tonnes of oil that smothered 400 kilometres of 
Brittany coastline in December 2000 or the 77,000 tonnes of oil that was leaking 
from an oil tanker that sank off the North western coast of Spain in November 
2002 (Doak, 2002; The Mariner Group, 2006). Both of which if they had occurred 
in New Zealand’s territorial waters would probably have had extremely 
detrimental environmental and economic repercussions for the coastal 
communities affected. 
 
Apart from the scale of damage that can occur from thousands of tonnes of oil if it 
is spilt in coastal waters, smaller spills (minor to medium) can also be biologically 
devastating.  Further to this serious ecological damage can also be caused from 
operational discharges from ships within territorial waters.  Up to now New 
Zealand has not been the recipient of a major oil spill, with most of the oil 
pollution in our coastal waters being from ship’s discharge and/or accidental spills 
in port/harbours.  Though, with the sinking of the cruise liner the Mikhail 
Lermontov in 1986 and the grounding of the Jody F Millennium in 2002, New 
Zealand had to deal with the possibility and reality, respectively, of medium sized 
oil spills.  Notwithstanding these ‘accidents’ the main reason New Zealand has 
not had to cope with a major spill is that we are not on any significant oil tanker 
routes.  Despite this the possibility of an oil spill occurring within our coastal area 
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is considerably higher today than 20 years ago as there has been a substantial 
increase of tankers, bulk carrier/container ships and other large vessels to New 
Zealand (Doerffer, 1992; Iversen, 1996).  
 
1.1 Research Motivation   
 
My personal interest for this thesis topic originated after a small oil spill occurred 
between the Poor Knights Islands Marine Reserves and the Northland coast, two 
days prior to a diving trip that I was to take at the reserve.  Initially, the relevant 
authorities forecast that the spill could take about two weeks to clean up and the 
environmental damage that might occur could destroy the dive site for many years 
to come. 
 
The oil spill was cleaned-up a lot sooner than the estimated two weeks and though 
it has been just over five years since the incident, it appears that little long-term 
ecological damage has occurred.  Nevertheless, all the tour and dive operators still 
lost at least a week's business at the height of the season and signs of the oil spill 
are still visible in the caves and archways of the islands.  As a diver I was annoyed 
that my attempt to dive at the Poor Knights had been prevented, but as an 
environmentalist I was very angry that the reserve could have been destroyed for 
the foreseeable future.   
 
I recognize that my feelings of annoyance and anger might have had the potential 
to create a bias in my research.  However, I will state now that both emotions 
were neutralized by the favourable outcome, of the oil spill, and with the passage 
of time.  Secondly, as I explain in the Methodology Chapter I reflect upon my 
worldview and undertake to guard against any bias.  
 
1.2 Introducing the Research Question & Objectives 
 
Sustainability is a concept that has emerged from the environmental sciences and 
global development agencies and stems from the theory of Sustainable 
Development which is detailed in Chapter Two.  Nevertheless, a brief explanation 
of Sustainable Development is warranted here and is provided for by the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) (1987 43) as 
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“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations”. 
 
This outline of Sustainable Development is non-specific and therefore can be 
interpreted in different ways.  The same could be said for sustainability, albeit 
possibly not to the same degree.  An example of this is the two subsequent 
definitions.  Both originated from the same source and although they are similar, 
the first suggests a much broader remit than the second.  The first is 
“sustainability may be defined as having four elements: to conserve the stock of 
natural assets; to avoid damaging the regenerative capacity of ECO-SYSTEMS 
(emphasis in the original); to achieve greater social and economic equality; and to 
avoid imposing risks and costs on future generations” (Bullock et al. 2000 849).  
The second description of sustainability is that it “… refers to management 
practices that are designed to ensure that the exploitation of resources is 
conducted in a manner that protects the resource base for use by future 
generations” (Bullock et al. 2000 849).  Thus, to put more succinctly, 
sustainability entails resource and/or environmental preservation and inter-
generational equity.  As such it denotes a far more eco-centric perspective than 
Sustainable Development, which implies development as the primary objective.  
 
Another variation of Sustainable Development is sustainable management.  To a 
greater extent sustainable management is aligned to the concept of sustainability 
and is the fundamental tenet of the Resource Management Act 19991 (RMA), 
New Zealand’s principal environmental legislation.  The RMA governs natural 
and physical resources, and as such has a definitive role in protecting the oceanic 
environs of New Zealand (Memon et al. 1995; Parliamentary Commissioner for 
the Environment (PCE), 1999).   
 
 The citizenry of New Zealand rely heavily on the marine environment for 
commercial operations such as fisheries and tourism; also many enjoy 
recreational, aesthetic and spiritual ties to the coastal marine area (CMA).  
Accordingly the sustainability of the CMA could be considered vital to the 
economic and socio-cultural well-being of New Zealanders.  A major oil spill 
which could cause widespread ecological damage, cripple or destroy marine and 
tourism operations and ensure that the human values associated with the coast are 
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lost, possibly for many years is unthinkable.  For this reason, a proactive stance 
towards the prevention of a major oil spill would appear advisable.  Consequently 
it will be the legislation that regulates New Zealand’s marine environment and 
what preventative measures to marine oil spills that feature in our laws that will be 
the main subject of this research. 
 
1.2.1 Research Question and Objectives 
 
The research question is:  
 
    How does New Zealand’s legislation prevent oil spills in its territorial waters?  
                 
To realize the research question two main objectives need to be answered. They 
are; 
 
Objective One: to explore whether the cause of New Zealand's marine oil spills 
             are due to the oil tanker/shipping companies business operation 
  and/or ideology.              
 
Objective Two: to establish what governmental measures are in place to lessen the 
  impact of an oil spill in New Zealand.  
 
To accomplish the objectives and answer the research question, three central 
issues will be investigated.  Firstly, New Zealand’s proactive and reactive 
strategies to oil spills in response to international and national environmental and 
shipping legislation, agreements and/or protocols will be considered.  Included in 
this analysis of domestic law will be whether the precepts of the Precautionary 
Principle is recognized and upheld.  The reason for this is that many international 
treaties that New Zealand is signatory or party to incorporate these precepts.  
Secondly the current laws, policies and regulations regarding the risk of a major 
oil spill in New Zealand’s coastal marine environment will be examined.  Thirdly, 
to verify the extent to which reality reflects legislative intent, two cases of oil spill 
incidents in New Zealand waters will be analysed and the findings presented. 
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1.3 Thesis Structure   
 
Chapter Two discusses the theoretical perspectives relevant to this research.  
Three main concepts will be examined; first Weak versus Strong Sustainability, 
two macroeconomic versions of Sustainable Development, then the Sustainability 
Imperative, followed by the Precautionary Principle.  Two other processes, 
‘ecological footprint’ and ‘integrated coastal management’ will be outlined with 
respect to the significance that these processes and theories have in both New 
Zealand's international and national environmental legislation and with 
consideration to oil spills.   
 
Chapter Three describes the methodology and methods that were used in this 
research.  The research design is defined and includes the author’s approach to the 
research and other possible limitations are explained.  The qualitative research 
methods of case studies, interviews and discourse analysis will also be discussed.     
 
Chapter Four introduces and reviews New Zealand’s statutory environmental 
framework that governs the coastline and territorial sea.  This consists of the 
identification of the international and regional treaties, protocols and agreements, 
which pertain to the marine environment, that New Zealand is a party or a 
signatory to and analyses our national maritime statutes and policies as to whether 
they are proactive or reactive.  
 
Chapter Five presents the case studies.  This chapter considers two cases, the first 
and major case study of this thesis happened in December 1999 off the Northland 
coast.  Although it was a small oil spill, it caused major concern as it occurred 
within the boundaries of a sensitive marine eco-system and could have caused 
extensive environmental damage. The other case study presented is a desktop 
review of an oil spill off the Gisborne coast in February 2002 (Figure One). 
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Figure One: Location of case study areas (Oulton, 2006).   
 
In Chapter Six the author focuses on the analysis of the major issues that have 
emerged from the research.  The legislative influences and authority that govern 
the management of the coastal marine area are examined through the information 
collected from the case studies.  In addition, this chapter speaks to the question of 
integrated coastal management. 
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In Chapter Seven the conclusions of the research are presented.  The two 
objectives are examined through the review and analysis of the international and 
national legislation and two case studies and the research question is answered.  A 
brief summing up of the main theories is given and the research limitations are 
revisited.  Finally, suggestions for further research will be proposed.    
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework    
 
The objective of this chapter is to establish the meaning of Sustainable 
Development and environmental sustainability as relevant to this research.  The 
basis for evaluating the following theoretical framework is that Sustainable 
Development and economic progress underpin several, if not all, of the 
international and regional treaties that regulate the use and protection of New 
Zealand's maritime domain.  Further these treaties may have greatly influenced 
New Zealand's national oceanic environmental standards.  Should this be the case 
they might have enhanced New Zealand's ability to counteract an oil spill in the 
CMA, thereby strengthening the sustainability of our marine environment.   A 
review of these theories begins with a description of the evolution of Sustainable 
Development.  Then the dominant economic paradigm of the western world and 
the two major economic theories of Weak and Strong Sustainability are discussed.  
Next the Sustainability Imperative will be explored with respect to the perception 
that environmentalism and economic development are a progression from 
independence to dependence.   Also under this ideology the problem of 
understanding Sustainable Development in context is recognized as an 
epistemological shift.  Finally, consideration is given to sustainability as a radical 
and holistic concept under the prerequisite of the Precautionary Principle.   
 
2.1 Sustainable Development – The Evolution    
 
Acknowledgment that the earth may be facing significant environmental 
difficulties came to the attention of the general population with the publishing of 
Silent Spring (Carson, 1962).  Carson recognized that birds and other 
insectivorous animals were ingesting the pesticide dichloro-diphenyl-
trichloroethane (DDT), used to control insects.  Rather than breaking down or 
being egested, the pesticide was bioaccumulating in the birds and animals, 
causing detrimental health effects and/or death.  The residue from the DDT had 
previously been thought to have negligible side effects and the occurrence of 
bioaccumulation was unrecognised. 
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The Population Bomb by Paul Ehrlich in 1970 sounded another alarm.  He drew 
our attention to the fact that the human population, after centuries of extremely 
slow growth, had shifted into a period of geometric growth that was, and to some 
extent still is, considered explosive.  The two main messages that Ehrlich wanted 
to warn the public of was that the earth could not withstand this continual growth 
of the human population and that such escalation would be very difficult to 
reverse.  In the years since Silent Spring and Population Bomb, both the 
accumulation of ‘insignificant’ environmental side effects and the ever increasing 
human population have been recognized as serious causes of environmental stress. 
 
Consequently, these two publications, along with the continual escalation of 
environmental damage, were arguably the catalyst for a myriad of environmental, 
economic and social research.   Through this research several new development 
ideologies emerged, of which the most well known is Sustainable Development, 
which either just included the protection of the environment as one of the many 
issues to be considered focused on ecosystem preservation.  Thus, Sustainable 
Development diverged, sometimes dramatically, from the dominant development 
template of capitalism and industrialism utilized by many, if not all, ‘first world’ 
nations in the twentieth century (Esteva, 1992; Watts, 1993).  
 
Although Sustainable Development, as a theory, grew during the 1960s and 70s it 
did not come to the world’s attention until 1987 with the Brundtland Report by the 
World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) to the United 
Nations (Dryzek, 1997).  This report promoted the concept of Sustainable 
Development and advanced understanding of the need for societies to protect the 
environment and natural resources.  The overall vision of the report and the most 
widely quoted definition of Sustainable Development, is Brundtland’s own, 
“Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable – to ensure that it 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs” (WCED, 1987 8).  Hence, the notion of 
nature in-relation to humans and the environmental debt that will be owed to 
future generations are the foundations of Sustainable Development theory 
(Bullock et al. 2000). 
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Two opposing economic representations of Sustainable Development are Weak 
and Strong Sustainability.  The proponents of Weak Sustainability adopt the 
position that humans can use/abuse every resource because technology will 
provide for future generations (Pearce, 1993).  In contrast advocates of Strong 
Sustainability submit that natural capital must be preserved for future generations 
(Costanza et al. 2001).  Both these models and other ideology regarding the 
concept of resource/environmental use/conservation will be investigated to 
discover where New Zealand’s environmental legislation is theoretically centred 
and whether the direction secures the sustainability of New Zealand's marine 
environment.  Firstly, the economic blueprint of capitalism practiced by mature 
industrialised nations will be explored.  
 
2.2 Economics and Sustainability    
 
2.2.1 Capitalism 
 
Capitalist ideals measure development and progress mainly in economic terms 
such as productivity and profitability and often with little regard to either the 
damage inflicted on the environment, sustainability or the people who will follow 
(Brune et al. 1997).   One of the main assumptions of capitalism is that continuing 
economic growth is possible.  Further, resource depletion, pollution and other 
environmental impacts of economic activity are treated as externalities 
(Bottomore et al. 1985; Hutton et al. 2000).   
 
Capitalism or the free enterprise system is distinguished by three properties; 
 
• Its continuous effort to expand wealth is exercised by both private 
enterprise and individuals …; and 
• Capitalism is coordinated by a network of markets … [and these] 
markets are the source of unprecedented adaptability; and 
• Capitalism is uniquely characterised by a dual system of power.  
Rather than answering to a single political authority, capitalism 
has a private sector dominated by the decisions of business 
enterprise.  The judgements of consumers, a public sector and 
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government which exercises its traditional powers are a limited 
but important regulatory influence over the private sector 
(Bullock et al. 2000 103).  
 
Certain characteristics of capitalism seem to apply to the economic principles of 
many governments, including New Zealand, and many businesses such as the oil 
transportation sector. Although the marketplace and consumerism of many 
countries drive the production and transportation of oil and oil products, it is often 
the inadequate or negligent business practices or behaviour of the oil industry that 
appear to be responsible for most of the major oil spills in the marine 
environment.  A variety of reasons could account for these inadequacies however, 
but for a notable number of companies it is probable that the profit margin often 
dominates over other business requirements (Ross, 1973).  Inside the oil industry, 
though more specifically the tankers, this capitalist philosophy has led to certain 
operational shortcomings.  Examples of poor commercial procedures are; the 
continued use of tankers that are well past their prime; low or no maintenance of 
vessels; and communication difficulties between officers and crew (Doak, 2002; 
Transport Accident Investigation Commission (TAIC), 2003).  Consequently, any 
one of these failings or a combination of them or other faults most probably cause 
the majority of oil spills in the marine environment.  
 
Accordingly, my research will explore whether the cause of New Zealand's 
marine oil spills are due to the oil tanker/shipping companies business practices 
and/or ideology.   
 
Before summarising the differences between Weak and Strong Sustainability, a 
definition from an economic viewpoint of Sustainable Development is necessary.  
Supporters of the economic view of Sustainable Development accept that 
development can be defined as “sustainable if it does not decrease the capacity to 
provide non-declining per capita utility for infinity” (Neumayer, 1999 9).  
Roughly translated this means that future generations are left with no less an 
amount of ‘capital’ then the present generation enjoys.  Capital in this case is 
recognised to include; human capital - our knowledge and skills; human- 
produced capital - the built environment and machinery; and natural capital - all 
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things that are produced by or exist in nature that is not human-made (Turner et 
al. 1994).   
 
The problem of Sustainable Development however, is that there are many often 
conflicting definitions.  The reasons for this could be that ethics/values/views 
differ among people, industries, non-government organisations (NGO) and 
governments on what Sustainable Development means and also how to achieve it.  
This is the case with the advocates on either side of the Weak or Strong 
sustainability scale.  Both accept the definition, as put forth above, but then they 
part company.  Strong Sustainability, a more eco-friendly economic model, is 
espoused by many environmentally committed scientists, ecological economists, 
NGOs and individual environmentalists (Pearce, 1993; Turner et al. 1994).  While 
promoters of Weak Sustainability include many organisations that believe in the 
‘free enterprise’ system for economies, such as  multi-national corporations, some 
governments and the World Bank (Harris, 2003). 
 
2.2.2 Weak Sustainability    
 
Weak Sustainability is an economic model that is based on the work of two 
neoclassical economists, John Hartwick a resource economist and Robert Solow, a 
Nobel Laureate.  For this reason, Pearce (1997) renders Weak Sustainability as 
neoclassical economics.  Hartwick et al. (1998 394) do not consider the economy 
of Sustainable Development as Weak Sustainability, rather they regard the “… 
idea of Sustainable Development as an economy in a steady-state …”.  In this 
economic model the management of renewable and non-renewable resources are 
treated differently.  For non-renewable resources the process is similar to the 
‘green’ solution (i.e. use replenishable forms of energy, recycle if applicable 
(although this has limits) and lessen the demand or increase the efficiency of the 
non-renewable resource). 
 
However, the formula for renewable resources is a system of equality between the 
“flows of input, economy and production process and flows of output” (Hartwick 
et al. 1998 395).  For this steady-state economy to be sustainable, with the same 
degree of consumption as experienced by the affluent societies of today, requires a 
fixed level of human population.  Therefore, as the human population is still 
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increasing and the earth is a finite biosphere to achieve a steady-state economy 
other factors need to be realised.  These could include a decrease of per capita 
utilisation (though this might disregard intra and inter-generational equity), 
technological advances and the interchange between the human produced and 
natural capital to ensure a constant capital rule (Daly et al. 2004; Solow, 1993).   
 
To the more eco-centric campaigners of Sustainable Development, this constant 
capital rule is known as Weak Sustainability or as Neumayer, (1999 24) calls it 
the “substitutable paradigm”.  One of the requirements of Sustainable 
Development is the provision of sustainable capital for future generations and 
under Weak Sustainability it is argued that it does not matter which form of 
capital is passed on.  Therefore, encapsulated in the substitutable model is that as 
long as human-produced capital is built up, natural capital can be run down 
(Costanza et al. 2000).  Accordingly, if enough investment is made into human 
produced capital then sustainability is guaranteed, virtually automatically, and if 
‘sustainability’ does not occur then the application of specific taxes, regulations or 
subsidies will redress the imbalance.  Or as Hueting et al. (1998 144) state 
“[w]eak sustainability takes the line that the elements of the environment are 
substitutional in the short term, so that restoration of lost elements can be 
postponed, awaiting cheaper solutions provided by future technologies”.  
 
Consequently, Weak Sustainability is similar to the Cornucopian view, that 
growth is limited only when science and technology cannot advance any further.  
Ergo there is no reason why these advances should stop and as a result, due to 
these advances the Earth is not finite, as new technologies create new resources.  
Both these points of view, Weak Sustainability, which values human-made 
capital, and the Cornucopians’ who value human capital, believe that these values 
are substitutable and/or above the value of nature.  This is a very anthropocentric 
perspective, in that ‘nature’ only has value when humans value it (Maskell, 1998; 
Simon, 1999). 
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2.2.3 Strong Sustainability 
 
At the core of Strong Sustainability, Neumayer (1999 1) states:  
 
 … is the belief that natural capital itself should be preserved for 
future generations in addition to the total aggregate capital stock.  This 
is because natural capital is regarded as non-substitutable both in the 
production of consumption goods and as a more direct provider of 
utility.  
  
Even with this core belief, there have emerged two divergent interpretations of 
Strong Sustainability.  One of these interpretations is very similar to Weak 
Sustainability with the only difference being that natural capital is an additional 
requirement to total capital.  An illustration of how this works is the consumption 
of a non-renewable resource such as oil, this resource can be used but the profit 
earned would be reinvested in the development of renewable energy sources.   
 
The alternative interpretation, as Turner et al. (1994 56) explain is that some 
forms of natural capital are not substitutable and therefore are considered to be 
“critical natural capital”.  Further to this Daly (1995 cited in Markandya et al. 
2002 27) states “that natural resources are basically complements to the man-
made capital in production and that decreased availability of natural resources can 
be compensated only to a limited extent by increased man-made capital”.  Hence, 
champions of this stronger version of Strong Sustainability believe that any 
resource stock used in the flow of productivity and utility must be able to have a 
regenerative capability and this cannot be exceeded.  Examples of how this may 
work could be that for every hectare of pine trees felled for timber there is another 
hectare planted.  Another is that “the rate of erosion of topsoil may not exceed the 
rate of formation of such soil due to weathering”, put forth by Hueting et al. (1998 
145). 
 
Both these examples could be seen as admirable aspirations.  Neither however, 
takes into account that a pine tree could take anything from 10 to 30 years or more 
to mature and that it can take up to 10,000 years for topsoil to form in the natural 
environment.  Even though this interpretation also does not imply that nature 
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should be preserved as it is, it does suggest that natural resource stocks remain 
intact.  Further to this it believes that ‘critical natural capital’ is non-substitutable.  
The reasons for this non-substitutability are given by Pearce and Turner (1990 43-
58) as follows; 
 
• There is a considerable amount of uncertainty and ignorance about 
the detrimental consequences of depleting natural capital. 
• Natural capital loss is often irreversible. 
• Some functions of natural capital provide and maintain basic life- 
support systems. 
• Future generations cannot be compensated for any environmental 
degradation via increased consumption opportunities. 
 
In summary, the main distinctions between Strong and Weak Sustainability are 
that Weak Sustainability espouses the opinion that the resources, either natural or 
human-produced, are substitutable.  That any problems human-kind may face, 
such as depletion of both finite and non-finite stock and pollution will be solved 
by technological progress.  Lastly, that greater availability of produce and the 
consumption thereof will recompense the future generations for environmental 
degradation.   While there is a divergence of thinking regarding what Strong 
Sustainability actually is, the weaker version of it can be more readily associated 
with Weak Sustainability than Strong Sustainability.  Although the idea of profit 
from the use of finite resources, being spent on discovering renewable and non-
toxic sources, has some merit.  Finally, the stronger interpretation of Strong 
Sustainability promotes the idea that not all resources are substitutable.  Some 
natural resources or ‘critical natural capital’, such as the oceans and atmosphere, 
need preservation for many reasons, but the main one being that their function 
provides basic life-support for all species on earth.  The two other key 
components are that any natural stock used is replaced before capacity of the stock 
to regenerate is exceeded and that there should be inter-generational equity.  
 
At the beginning of this chapter the most prominent definition of Sustainable 
Development was quoted.  However, this definition of Sustainable Development 
is fairly ambiguous and, as previously mentioned, many different descriptions of 
this theoretical perspective have emerged.  At the heart of many explanations of 
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Sustainable Development is that humans assume nature to be subordinate (to us), 
but that economic growth that includes environmental protection is the means to 
long-term sustainability (Attfield, 1999; Becker, 1999).  Two of the paradoxes of 
Sustainable Development, being Weak and Strong Sustainability, both of which 
originated from an anthropocentric viewpoint, to a greater or lesser extent, have 
already been explored.  Therefore, now a more eco-centric perspective will be 
examined, being the Sustainability Imperative. 
 
2.3 Alternative Sustainability Principles 
 
The Sustainability Imperative has arisen as a critique of both Weak and Strong 
Sustainability, which are economically driven models of Sustainable 
Development.  In contrast the Sustainability Imperative is an ecological 
imperative and driven by the need to live within the Earth’s biophysical carrying 
capacity and maintain biodiversity, as a sustainable future is only possible if we 
reduce our environmental footprint.    
   
2.3.1 Why the Imperative?  
 
Bourg (2003 2) asserts that “[w]e have disrupted all the main biogeochemical 
cycles in the biosphere, for example: the carbon cycle … the nitrogen cycle … 
and the sulphur cycle …”.  Further to this there are recent predictions stating that 
by the end of the 21st century, average temperatures could have risen by more than 
10 degrees Celsius in the highest latitudes and that the oceans’ capacity to absorb 
carbon could be altered for thousands of years to come (Bourg, 2003).  These 
predictions, along with many others, inform us that the human race and the way 
we value short-term wealth could lead to the long-term disturbance of the earth’s 
systems.  Therefore, it is imperative that the environmental degradation occurring 
now be reduced or stopped and that an attempt be made to reverse the damage, 
especially if intergenerational equity is to be achieved (Giddings et al. 2002).  
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 2.3.2 Sustainable Development v Sustainable Imperative  
 
This hypothesis of Sustainable Development, as indicated before, is contested due 
to the differing worldviews and/or ideologies held by both people and 
organisations.  Two mainstream neoclassical macroeconomic models are 
illustrated in Figure Two and Figure Three.  Figure Two “conceptualises the 
sustainability problem as that of maintaining a constant level of consumption per 
capita forever” (Common, 1996 citied in Peet, 2003 17).  Figure Three is an 
economic design that portrays the eco-system as a sub-system of the economy.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure Two:  Monetary flow model of macroeconomics (Common, 1996 citied in Peet, 
2003 17). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure Three: Eco-system as a sub-system of the economy (Daly, 2004 22). 
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These macroeconomic paradigms show that the prevailing cultural ethic, of some 
if not most of the industrialised nations, is that nature is seen as separate to 
humans or as only a supply of resources and a sink for waste.  That economic 
growth and increasing consumption are the main objectives to be aimed for and 
the degradation and/or ‘loss’ of ecosystems or the ‘gain’ of pollution, though 
regrettable, is necessary to economic expansion.  In contrast to the above models 
of anthropocentric and capitalist ideals are alternatives which aid the reduction of 
biosphere damage.  These paradigms recognise that Earth is a closed system in 
which all economic and social activity occurs. The theory of Sustainable 
Development is one and particularly over the last 15 years has seen the integration 
of the economy, society and the environment (Figure Four). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure Four: The simple concept of Sustainable Development (Adapted from O’Riordan 
et al. 2001 15).  
 
The above model presents the boundary crossovers between the economy, society 
and the environment as sustainability, and does consider that all three areas of 
human existence do overlap and cooperation between all three is necessary 
(Giddings et al, 2002). 
 
The sustainability paradigm however, that illustrates the ‘reality of life’ is again 
an uncomplicated concept that depicts that instead of the three areas of human life 
being autonomous, although linked, they are in fact situated in a hierarchical 
relationship (Figure Five) (Opio-Ohongo, 2003). 
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Figure Five: The Sustainability Connection (Adapted from Opio-Ohongo, 2003 6). 
 
This hierarchical relationship shows that economic sustainability is subordinate to 
societal sustainability and both are subordinate to ecological sustainability.  As 
Peet, (2003 19) stated “Humans are totally dependent upon the natural 
environment for the necessities of life … In reality we are all inseparably parts of 
the totality of life on Earth”.  The fact that this statement is true does not alter the 
position that human activities have proven to have had a substantial influence on 
the natural environment, and often without the knowledge of what our activities 
will cause to the very complex eco-systems that we depend upon (Kassiola, 2003).   
This last diagram may also be how one might visualize Sustainable Management.  
This concept differs from Sustainable Development in that economic growth is 
not on an equal footing with the environment.  Under Sustainable Management 
the environment either ‘comes first’ or the preservation of the environment is 
given preference when decisions are made concerning economic goals.  
Consequently, humans and their economic activities are not separated from 
nature, but are a part of it and in some cases totally dependent on it (Memon et al. 
1995). 
 
A critical tool of the Sustainability Imperative is the model of our ‘ecological 
footprint’.  Wackernagel et al, (1996 5) describe the ‘ecological footprint’ as “… a 
measure of the “load” imposed by a given population on nature.  It represents the 
land area necessary to sustain current levels of resource consumption and waste 
discharge by that population”.  This model mainly deals with the “load” placed on 
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land by humans but it can incorporate the coastal marine area as this is both an 
area of resource consumption and waste assimilation.  A city or country's 
‘ecological footprint’ can demonstrate how the citizenry value nature. 
 
At present it appears that New Zealand's ‘ecological footprint’ is below its 
carrying capacity, but this has more to do with the land and sea area we claim in 
comparison to the small population of the country.  However, as New Zealand 
continues to develop, our ‘ecological footprint’ will increase and as the last two 
decades have shown our coastal areas have become increasingly populated and 
subsequently more polluted.  The Precautionary Principle has consequently been 
advanced (e.g. through the New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement) as an 
approach that should aid avoidance of non-sustainable practices. 
 
2.3.3 The Precautionary Principle   
 
The Precautionary Principle is not a new concept.  Over the last four centuries or 
more the Principle has been applied in areas such as public health and medicine.  
However, the Precautionary Principle as an explicit and coherent concept with 
regards to environmental hazards did not occur until the early 1970s.  Initially the 
Precautionary Principle was applied to marine pollution in the North Sea and was 
included in the agreements regarding the North Sea that were ratified at the first 
International Conference on Protection of the North Sea in 1984 (Harremoes et al. 
2002).  Although the Principle was adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1982 it was not until the Rio Summit 10 years later that it gained 
global recognition.  World leaders at the summit embraced the Precautionary 
Principle as one of the key principles of Sustainable Development and this 
ensured the widespread international application of it.  As a result, the 
Precautionary Principle is now incorporated into many international laws, treaties 
and conventions that concern the environment (Harding et al. 1993; O’Riordan et 
al. 1994).  
 
As with Sustainable Development, the Precautionary Principle also has varying 
definitions, but the one recognised through the Rio Summit 1992 is: 
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 In  order to protect the  environment, the Precautionary Approach  shall 
be widely applied by states according to their capabilities.  Where there 
are  threats of serious or irreversible  damage, lack of scientific certainty 
shall not be used as  a reason for  postponing  cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation (Harremoes et al. 2002 6). 
 
Therefore, the Precautionary Principle basically requires that humans protect the 
natural environment in advance of conclusive scientific evidence that harm will 
occur from a new or continuing human activity (Box One).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a basic criticism of the Precautionary Principle which is that it is 
unnecessary in a society that already has a risk assessment process in place 
(Harding et al. 1993).  Nevertheless, risk assessments often have to wait for 
evidence of harm, whereas the Principle gives weight to lack of evidence.  
Consequently this ‘lack of evidence’ actually places the burden of proof of harm 
on the proponents of an activity, instead of the potential victim of the harm.  The 
Principle therefore calls for zero risk, but as there is always risk the goal of the 
Principle is to reduce the damage and/or risk in comparison to that which has been 
incurred in the past (Deville et al. 1997).  By implementing the Precautionary 
Principle the affected community can thoroughly examine and consider 
alternatives to potential detrimental activities. 
 
Just as there are inconsistencies among the definitions of the Precautionary 
Principle there is also no uniform or global method regarding the implementation 
of it.  Although the Precautionary Principle is a general principle and not a set of 
Box One     Possible Formula for the Precautionary Principle 
 
A formula for the principle could be: 
 
         Scientific uncertainty + suspected harm = precautionary action 
 
Whereby: 
Uncertainty = ignorance, indeterminacy (the unknown of large eco-systems) and statistical 
         model or parameter ambiguities that may be diminished  with further information. 
 
Harm          = serious (covers large areas or extends over long time periods) 
                      irreversible and cumulative 
           
Action        = preventative and anticipatory (Harding et al. 1993; O’Riordan et al. 2001). 
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rules it should, in performance terms, have a practical approach.  It has been 
suggested that these functional guidelines are defined (Box Two) (Deville et al. 
1997). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If these are applied it is clear that the Precautionary Principle is not only a tool to 
ensure vigorous attention is paid to the ‘uncertainty’ of negative impacts on the 
environment but that it is also a transparent and inclusive decision-making 
process.  As mentioned earlier, the Precautionary Principle has been assimilated 
into many international and regional environmental agreements, examples of 
which include the Río Declaration on Environment and Development and Agenda 
21 (Deville et al. 1997; Harremoes et al. 2002).  New Zealand is a signatory to 
many of these treaties and therefore has either a legal or moral obligation to 
include the axioms of the Precautionary Principle into its statutes and/or policies.  
Additionally, some socially-minded private enterprises have recognised that the 
Principle may have long-term economic benefits for themselves as well.    
 
The Precautionary Principle in its entirety may not be applicable in the case of oil 
spills as we know the ramifications of what thousands of tonnes of oil into coastal 
areas and along coastlines will do.  Consequently, it would be advantageous for 
all parties concerned such as the government and the oil industry and shipping 
companies to prevent such a known threat from being realised in New Zealand. 
   
 
Box Two    Examples of Functional Guidelines of the Precautionary Principle 
 
• Establishment of the long-term goals of the activity or project with regards to the 
environmental, social and economic aspects. 
• Analysis of the risk assessment of the activity/project to define the parameters of 
‘potential harm’, including short and long-term cumulative, out reaching and/or 
indirect harm to other ecological and social systems. 
• Assessment of alternatives and application of the risks/harm they may cause. 
• Analysis of both the source and extent of uncertainty and evaluation of all the 
evidence.  This should include; all known scientific data and the possible gaps in the 
research; consultation with people/groups directly involved in the issues; and 
determination of the best technologies and industry developments available. 
• Adoption of appropriate precautionary/protection provisions that could range from; 
conditional approvals such as monitoring/feedback and timescales and/ or 
insurance/liability bonds and/or rehabilitation fees to a moratorium or complete ban 
(Deville et al. 1997). 
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2.4 Chapter Summary   
 
The considerable ongoing environmental research and the abundance of 
information that permeates our lives, regarding the destruction of the natural 
environment, demonstrate to us that we are slowly destroying the earth.  Various 
international organisations such as the WCED and the United Nations recognised 
this fact nearly 20 years ago and began the ‘imperative’ to sustain the 
environment. This was initiated with the introduction of Sustainable 
Development, an ideology that today has global recognition.   
 
Anthropocentrism, which assumes that humans are valued above all other beings, 
and capitalism, the macroeconomic system employed by many nations, still 
dominate the majority of human activity.  Capitalism embraces the idea that all 
environmental impacts caused by economic enterprise are independent and 
therefore need not be accounted for.  Consequently, much of the environmental 
damage that has already, and continues to occur, has as yet to be paid for by the 
human race.  Although sustainability has become a global imperative its 
implementation as Sustainable Development has followed diverging perspectives.  
Two discussed in this thesis were from an economic perspective.  The first and far 
more ‘material’ supposition is Weak Sustainability, which regards the ‘totality of 
nature’ including all resources to be substitutable.  As a result, this substitutability 
would ensure that economic growth is sustainable. 
 
This point of view contrasted with the other more ‘conservative’ premise of 
Strong Sustainability or the non-substitutable paradigm.  Under this hypothesis 
not all of nature or its resources can be substituted by either the production of 
goods and utilities or by technological advancement.  Hence, Strong Sustainability 
admits that there is a need to protect some aspects of nature to secure not only 
current living standards (of the western nations) but also the continuation of the 
human race. 
 
Other ideologies place quieter emphasis on environmental sustainability and eco-
centrism.  At the core of these perspectives ‘nature’ is considered to be of 
paramount importance, as without ‘nature’ humans would not exist.  Within the 
Sustainability Imperative it was acknowledged that humans are not just 
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interconnected or interdependent on the environment, but that in the most 
fundamental way we are totally reliant on ‘nature’.  The position of human-kind in 
relation to the environment should have therefore begun with precaution.  Though 
this did not occur it is possible that it is not too late.  Under the Precautionary 
Principle if there is scientific uncertainty of the harm that the natural environment 
may be exposed to by new human activity, it would not be undertaken.  This does 
not mean that no harm will be done or that no risks will be taken, but that they 
will be reduced or compensated for.  Further the Precautionary Principle allows a 
community, where the potential activity will be, to have a voice in the decisions 
that affect it.   
   
In conclusion the aim of this research is to discover, in both law and reality, the 
extent of New Zealand’s ability to guard itself from a major oil spill.  To achieve 
this and answer the research question, firstly some of the existing economic and 
environmental theoretical perspectives were outlined in this chapter.  As 
previously revealed, many of these theories and ideals such as Sustainable 
Development and the Precautionary Principle are already incorporated into 
various international environment and maritime treaties.  Therefore, it is expected 
with New Zealand being a signatory to most of them, that these perspectives have 
been integrated into our domestic statutes.  One technique for developing close 
links between the international, national and regional provisions of marine 
sustainability, specifically in the coastal zone is Integrated Coastal Management 
(ICM).  ICM connects all levels of government with the local coastal issues in a 
process that implements an integrated plan for the development and protection of 
the coastal environment.  The research should determine whether New Zealand 
utilises the ICM approach in realizing the international treaties and environmental 
national statutes.  
 
Furthermore, with the identification of the Precautionary Principle and 
Sustainable Management, a criterion has been indicated that can be employed to 
determine whether New Zealand’s marine environmental legislation is proactive 
or reactive, in regards to our preparedness and response to an oil spill.  Both these 
issues will be reviewed in Chapter Four.  Prior to this chapter however, I will 
discuss how the concepts of Sustainable Development, sustainability and our 
‘ecological footprint’ support the methodological approaches used in the research.    
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Chapter Three: Methodology and Methods    
 
The aim of this chapter is to explain how the theories described in the previous 
chapter directed the methodological approaches adopted in the research. To begin 
a clarification between the methodology and methods will be given.  Then the 
research design will be elucidated followed by the research limitations, where I 
will ‘place’ myself with regards to the research.  The reason for addressing my 
postionality under the research limitations is that it can be considered a constraint, 
although I also explain how this is addressed.  The other restrictions to the 
research are also noted and finally the research methods are stipulated.    
 
3.1 Methodology  
 
Methodology has been defined as the general framework applied when embarking 
on a research topic, while the methods are instruments used to accomplish the 
research objectives and answer the research question.  Methodology therefore is 
the research design and is affected by the researcher’s positionality or ‘philosophy 
of knowledge’ (Davidson et al. 1999).  The research design is defined by Yin, 
(1994 18) “… as the logic that links the data to be collected (and the conclusions 
to be drawn) to the initial questions of a study”.  Ergo the research design is “an 
action plan for getting from here to there, where here … [is] the initial set of 
questions to be answered and there [are the] conclusions …” (Yin, 1994 19) 
(emphasis in original).  While positionality can be translated as a person's 
worldview, this can be broken down to questions of ontology “what things are 
there in the world” and questions of epistemology “… what really exists, as 
opposed to that which appears to exist but does not …” (Bullock et al. 2000 608).  
These questions of philosophy are recognised as “… essential to the research 
because all research makes assumptions about such issues …” Tolich et al. (1999 
23). 
 
Accordingly it could be reasoned, from the above statements, that the research 
design is derived from the theory the choices of which are a reflection of the 
researcher’s positionality.  This is supported by Davidson et al. (1999 6) who state 
that “[r]esearch helps us build or modify our theories, but those theories drive our 
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… [methodology].  It is only with reference to the theory that the … 
[methodology] makes any sense”.  The rationale however, as to why ‘theory 
drives the methodology’ is that key components of the theory can require a 
particular perspective or approach to answer the research question as the 
subsequent research design and researcher position illustrates. 
 
3.2 Research Design 
 
The research focuses on marine environmental legislation and the sustainability of 
New Zealand’s coastal waters with regard to oil spills.  Hence, the pertinent 
theoretical perspectives include Sustainable Development, the Sustainability 
Imperative, the Precautionary Principle, and our ‘ecological footprint’.  These 
theories then necessitated the data to be collected by certain methodological 
approaches.  For instance, Sustainable Development is a theoretical position that 
“stresses an openness to a range of voices and perspectives in social inquiry … 
and political empowerment” (Johnston et al. 2000 620).   
 
Moreover the theories of the Precautionary Principle, Sustainable Development, 
and sustainability perspectives are either the basis of or integrated into many, if 
not all, of the international maritime environmental treaties and accords that New 
Zealand is a party to.  As such, the discourse of these multilateral agreements in 
conjunction with our own environmental legislation required analysis to see 
whether the precepts of ‘conservation’ had been adopted.  Lastly, the concept of 
our ‘ecological footprint’ was one of the key prompts for the choice of using case 
studies.  Specifically, the major case study is situated in the coastal environs of 
Northland’s east coast; where the busiest shipping lanes in New Zealand are found 
and where New Zealand’s only oil refinery is located. 
 
In addressing theses questions and issues the initial decision was taken to adopt a 
qualitative approach to the research.  This reflects both the limited number of oil 
spills in New Zealand and a deliberate choice to seek the greater richness provided 
by a case study than a more extensive, but less rich quantitative analysis of oil 
spills generally.  The strengths and weaknesses of these approaches are well 
established (Box Three). 
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As the research entailed an in-depth look at the issue of oil spills in the coastal 
marine environment and the competence of the laws governing the protection and 
use of New Zealand’s territorial waters a qualitative approach was elected.  The 
case studies are both descriptive and exploratory research, while the discourse 
analysis of the contextual framework is explanatory research.  Preliminary 
research indicates there had been very few oil spills and because the research was 
primarily interested in direct exposure of spills a national survey would have been 
irrelevant as few people would have direct experience.  Consequently a targeted 
approach was adopted.  This enabled much richer data collection.  Further to this 
the data gathered in surveys, sampling and focus groups are often constrained by 
the necessity for simplistic questions, time allocation and impediments like the 
researcher’s knowledge of computer analysis programmes. 
 
Upon defining ‘what’ and ‘how’ I would investigate, the research then focused on 
two pivotal aspects; New Zealand’s international and national legislative 
obligations in relation to the prevention of oil spills in its territorial sea; and to 
provide in detail the occurrence of two oil spills in New Zealand waters.  The two 
oil spill case studies are the Poor Knights Islands Marine Reserve (PKIMR) spill 
in 1999 and a ‘desk-top’ review of an oil spill off the Gisborne coast in 2002.   
 
The primary focus is on the PKIMR case because it resulted in global precedent 
setting regulation.  The Gisborne case study was undertaken because it followed 
Box Three   
 
            Quantitative 
 
• Broad, but shallow 
• Seeks consensus 
• Tests Theory 
• Values detachment 
• Less flexible 
 
Primary Methods Used  
 
• Experiments (repeatable) 
• Surveys (large) 
• Sampling (large) 
• Longitudinal (lengthy time frame) 
 
(Davidson et al. 1999 120-126)  
 
                                                          
      Qualitative                                     
 
• Rich, but narrow                        
• Seeks differences  
• Generates Theory 
• Values personal involvement 
• Flexible 
 
       Primary Methods Used 
          
• Key Informant  
        Interviews 
• Case Study/ies 
• Discourse Analysis 
• Focus Groups 
• Observation 
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within three years of the PKIMR and provided an opportunity to cross-check 
some of the findings from the PKIMR case study. 
 
3.3 Research Limitations    
 
The primary limitations of this research are: bias introduced by my positionality 
and constraints to the ability to generalize the findings of two case studies to other 
places.  Less significant constraints are imposed by data collection and analytical 
methods used and these are discussed in the sections describing the specific 
techniques applied.  I will now ‘place’ myself within this research.   
 
3.3.1 Researcher’s Position 
 
Tolich et al. (1999 37) inform us that “reflexivity means that [researchers] always 
remain part of the social world that [they] are studying, so [researchers] can 
attempt to understand that world only from [their] daily experience of life” 
(emphasis in original).  This also adds the ‘richness of experience’ to the research 
as “… [t]he values of the researchers become an explicit part of the research 
process” (Tolich et al. 1999 39).   This ‘explicitness’ however, is necessary to 
counteract the fact that no social science researcher can eliminate their effect on 
what is being researched.  Consequently the researcher should continually reflect 
on what they do and how they do it, to ensure that the research is reflexive (Elliot, 
2005).   
 
I consider myself to be an environmentalist and even though this word can have 
many different interpretations; to me it is a belief in the precepts of holism and 
conservation.  For me holism means that ‘everything is connected’ (i.e. that all 
eco-systems relate to each other and therefore polluting one will usually damage 
another) and that all non-human species have an intrinsic value.  The precept of 
conservation, not only incorporates the Precautionary Principle, but also the 
concepts of ‘reduce, reuse and recycle’, ‘alternative’ resources and ‘actual’ 
sustainability.   
 
It has been said by Limb et al. (2001 271) that “[t]he researcher’s position is often 
raised in theoretical writings … [but can be] relative to methodological … issues”.    
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This is the case here as I have a personal interest in the research topic, as raised in 
the Introduction Chapter, because a planned scuba dive, at the PKIMR, was 
prevented due to an oil spill.   My frustration was momentary as the fear that the 
reserve could have been ecologically damaged, possibly for decades, seemed to be 
the ‘reality’. These concerns however, were only the catalyst.  For many years, 
and especially since I have returned to university, I have become aware that there 
are serious environmental issues regarding the sustainability of various human 
practices. This was highlighted by the situation with the shipping traffic off 
Northland’s east coast, as both the resource consumption and waste assimilation 
capacity of, or ‘ecological footprint’ on, the marine environment from shipping 
around the marine reserve may be reaching its maximum load.  My direct 
experience of this minor oil spill, though distressing at the time, focused my 
attention on the possibility of a major oil spill in New Zealand’s coastal waters 
and this then prompted the research.  Furthermore, the familiarity of this oil spill 
incident influenced my choice not only of the site but also the methodological 
approach (case studies).  Therefore, with both of these more eco-centric 
philosophies as my worldview, I position myself as a strong advocate for the 
preservation/protection of the environment.  As such, though I do acknowledge 
that it is improbable, if not impossible, to return specific eco-systems to their 
original state, I believe that human-kind could stop some of the more damaging 
economic practices and decelerate others. 
 
With this understanding of myself, I will endeavour to represent all my findings 
with reflexivity.  In this I draw on Tolich et al. (1999 37) who have described 
reflectivity as meaning that researchers “attempt to understand … only from 
[their] daily experience of life” (emphasis in original).   The only other limitations 
to my research were the subsequent availability of key informants and time 
constraints. 
 
3.3.2 Non- acquiescence of Key Informant/Stakeholder   
 
Due to my obligation to ensure objectivity and my responsibility to the research to 
hear and understand all sides of the major case study, I requested an interview 
with the Australia Direct New Zealand Direct Line (ANZDL) whose ship was 
culpable for the oil spill.  The initial contact was via the telephone.  Nevertheless, 
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after several phone calls to the person, I was informed could be of assistance, at 
the company's offices in Auckland and e-mails to the company's claims office in 
Sydney, with no reply, I asked to talk to someone else in authority.  Finally, the 
manager of the Auckland office, though he declined an interview, did answer two 
of the questions that I asked.  The answer to the first question was a ‘brush off’ 
and the answer to the second question, though unverifiable, rang true.  Though I 
did not have the opportunity to ask all the questions that I wanted to from this key 
informant, most of my queries were answered through the examination of other 
investigative and court transcripts.    
  
3.3.3 Time Constraint   
 
Another key informant/stakeholder that an interview and/or documentation was 
requested from was the Department of Conservation (DOC).  This government 
department was approached as it has jurisdiction over and responsibility for, the 
land area and all flora and fauna of the Poor Knights Islands.  Three weeks before 
visiting Whangarei to conduct the fieldwork, the department was contacted to 
arrange an interview.  After several calls it was established that the person who 
could have helped me the most had resigned from the department one week prior 
to my initial phone call.  I was informed that the only other person I could 
interview was away on holiday, until after my time in Whangarei.  Over the 14 
days that I was in Whangarei, I contacted DOC several times to see if I could at 
least look at their records of the PKIMR oil spill.  This also proved to be pointless 
as the filing clerk was not available to look for the files.  Thus, all my attempts to 
either interview a department representative or collect documentation prior to and 
during the fieldwork were unsuccessful. 
   
This Department could have been added to the list of non-acquiescent 
informants/stakeholders as it appears that they did not want to be interviewed.  
However, upon arrival back at the University there was an e-mail from the 
department.  It stated that the documentation I had requested had been found and 
was ready for my perusal.  I then asked for copies to be sent down to me, but as 
the person who I had been conversing with did not know what was relevant or 
irrelevant and  there was ‘quite a lot’ of it I was advised to return to Whangarei to 
look for myself.  This option was unavailable to me due to various constraints, the 
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main one being time.  Therefore, no further action was taken regarding this 
informant.  In the final resolution of this thesis I am confident that any 
information DOC may have provided has been derived from other sources. 
 
Similar constraints also emerged when endeavouring to build a chronology of key 
events.  I requested from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) 
clarification of seemingly inconsistent, even contradictory, information as to when 
New Zealand acceded to the International Maritime Organisation as the 
irregularity only became apparent late in the research.  A series of emails with the 
relevant MFAT official meant that when this thesis was submitted MFAT was 
unable to confirm the dates of accession despite seeking advice from other 
national or international bodies. 
 
3.4 Methods   
 
Before discussing the methods used in this research, an explanation of 
‘triangulation of data’ is required.  This axiom is a generalisation that necessitates 
a further description of the qualitative approach. 
 
Bouma, (2000 173) suggests that “[t]he aim of qualitative research is often to 
describe in detail what is happening in a group … community [or area]”.  
Consequently qualitative research has certain characteristics and Stake, (1995 47-
48) has defined them as holistic, empirical, interpretive and empathetic.  One type 
of qualitative research puts the emphasis on what one can observe, including the 
participants and/or informants.  The researcher relies more on intuition, is able to 
recognise problem-relevant events and understands the interaction between 
themselves and the subject.  Finally, the design can be responsive to changing 
events, the informer may have compatible worldview and/or values and the 
reporting allows a vicarious experience (Bouma, 2000; Stake, 1995).  Further to 
this Stake, (1995) suggests that good qualitative research also includes the 
attributes of having observations and interpretations that are validated.   
 
Although most of the above characteristics of qualitative research are self-
explanatory, the ‘triangulation of data’ needs further interpretation.  It has been 
proposed that ‘triangulation’ in research is a set of protocols.  That “data source 
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triangulation is an effort to see if what we are observing and reporting carries the 
same meaning when found under different circumstances” Stake, (1995 113).  In 
other words it is a form of validation to ensure that the data from one source is 
confirmed as true and reliable from other sources.   
 
3.4.1. Case Studies    
 
The use of case study/studies in research permits the researcher to analyse the 
reality of an issue including social and cultural interrelationships.  Case studies 
are representations of a particular event or set of circumstances that can be 
explored within the context of political, economic, cultural, social, historical, 
temporal and spatial confines (Stake, 1995).   For this reason Yin, (1994 1) states 
that “case studies are the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are 
being posed … and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within 
some real-life context”.  Accordingly, this was another reason for the use of case 
studies as the research question focuses on a phenomenon that has a real-life 
context.   
 
According to Yin, (1994) there are six main methods for gathering evidence in a 
case study.  These are documentation, interviews, participant observation, direct 
observation, archival records and physical artefacts and though all six have 
strengths and weaknesses, none has complete advantage over the others.  In the 
major case study, four of these sources of evidence were used being; direct 
observation, interviews, documentation and archival records.  Although 
interviews are considered a tool under the methodological approach of a case 
study, in this research I have separated them as a distinctive investigative 
technique.  The reason for this is that the major case study enquiry consumed only 
a quarter of the interview time.  Therefore, the methodological approach of ‘key’ 
informant interviews will be discussed separately in the chapter. 
 
The major case study, being an oil spill at the PKIMR in 1999, is an examination 
that includes; 
 
• A history of the geographical area (incorporating indigenous issues); and 
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• The cleanup operation and identification of the party responsible for the 
oil spill; and 
• The Environment Court case; and 
• The international legislative outcome from the oil spill  
 
A field visit to the site of the case study can aid the contextualization of the 
research topic and is another technique for the collection of evidence.  This direct 
observation can be formal, whereby the researcher specifically goes and observes 
and these observations are noted and measured or informal which can be noting 
down your overall impression while at an interview (Yin, 1994).  As I was visiting 
Whangarei at the time the oil spill occurred at the PKIMR, the initial direct 
observation required the remembrance of the community’s reaction and emotions 
at the time.  The second observation, while in the area conducting interviews in 
2004, was a visit to the marine reserve to witness the remaining oil spill evidence 
firsthand.  Both these direct observations were informal and have aided in the 
comprehension of the research question and theory. 
 
The documentation and archival records include; the initial investigation reports, 
maps and charts, and the Environment Court case findings and sentencing of the 
oil spill perpetrator.  Information on the management of the oil spill cleanup and 
general documentation concerning the coastal area of Whangarei and the PKIMR 
was also gathered.  Other sources of information specific to this case study 
included newspaper articles, a television news item and internet web sites. 
 
The ‘desk-top’ review of the second oil spill case study is the grounding of the 
Jody F Millennium, a bulk carrier, off the Gisborne coast on the 6th February 
2002.  The prompt for introducing this second case study is that the two oil spills 
are to some extent comparable.  Although the main case study was a minor spill 
and the 2002 incident was a medium spill there are similarities.  These include the 
fact that they both made landfall, they both required a clean-up operation and the 
ultimate reason for the spills appear to be human error.  Additionally, the ‘desk-
top’ review of the second case study introduces related information for analysis 
that the major case could not provide. 
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3.4.2 Interviews   
 
Qualitative approaches are generally seen as collaborative and unexploitative 
research and as such often the researcher and the researched in the interview can 
discover commonalities and exchange views in an environment of safety and 
support.  Of the three types of interviewing techniques (structured, semi-
structured and unstructured) the semi-structured interview offers the informants 
both flexibility and space to voice their views, while still allowing the interviewer 
the ability to pursue the questions.  This atmosphere of openness and interaction 
between the researcher and the researched also allows for unforeseen issues to be 
aired (Limb et al. 2001; Yin, 1994). 
 
Armed with this knowledge and to gather as much insight as possible to the 
research, semi-structured interviews were held with most of the key 
informants/stakeholders involved.  In order to identify the key 
informants/stakeholders, a list of the government authorities, that have jurisdiction 
over the coastal marine environment, was compiled and contact was initiated via 
phone to discover the appropriate individual/s to interview.  Of the three 
government agencies; two were extremely receptive to contributing to the 
research and the third after several attempts, appeared too busy or disorganised to 
help (as identified under the research limitations). 
 
The next major party involved with the PKIMR oil spill were the perpetrators of 
the spill, but they declined.  As the government agencies could only provide one 
side of the story, I also contacted one NGO, a private citizen and the local Maori 
Iwi who were all connected to the major case study area.  They all accepted the 
invitation to discuss the topic.  Most interviews were arranged by phone followed 
by written confirmation, which included a copy of the consent form for the 
informant’s perusal.  Four of the five ‘face to face’ interviews were undertaken at 
the interviewee’s workplace and the fifth was conducted at the Auckland Regional 
Council’s cafeteria.  The sixth interview was via telephone and e-mail 
conversations.  One interview lead to a new key informant, who had not 
previously been approached, and this contact, though not interviewed, proved 
extremely helpful with necessary documentation and archival records.  Later in 
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the research further information was received via telephone calls and emails from 
various government agencies (Box Four).     
 
 
 
All the interviews conducted in person were recorded on audiotape for later 
transcription.  This electronic aid and the semi-structure of the interviews 
provided several important advantages for the interviewee and myself.  Firstly, it 
allowed for a flexible and open interaction between us, and the freedom to express 
and explore issues not directly relevant to the research.  Secondly, upon 
transcription, it ensured that misinterpretation was minimised and finally the 
respondents could review the transcript, if they wanted to ensure its reliability and 
factualness.  Though the checking of the transcripts by the interviewee had the 
potential for the interviewee to change meanings or become less candid, this did 
not occur with the one informant who requested a review.  Written permission for 
the interviews were received from all interviewees  
 
The interview questions and/or angle of approach varied depending on who I was 
interviewing.    The interviews centred on three main ‘themes’;  
 
Box Four           Informants and/or Stakeholders
 
Wade Doak   - Photographer, Author and Environmentalist 
John Lee-Richards  - Maritime Safety Authority (MSA) (Auckland) 
Ian Niblock   - Northland Regional Council  
Hori Parata   - Ngati Wai Trust Board  
David Pattimore   - Forest and Bird Society (Northland) 
Hans Wetendorf   - Maritime Safety Authority (Whangarei) 
Other MSA Personnel*  - Te Atatu and Wellington  
Personnel*     - Dept. of Conservation- Invercargill, Wellington Regional 
  Council, Ministry of Trade and Foreign Affairs 
  (Asterisks – No consent forms) 
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• The oil spill at the Poor Knights Islands Marine Reserve, which included 
discussion of the clean-up, short and long-term impacts and the 
interviewee's thoughts and opinions of the incident; and 
• Legislation, policies and regulations regarding the coastal marine area, the 
shipping industry and the Oil Spill Response Team (OSRT); and 
• The application/approval of the mandatory ‘no-go’ area for all ships. 
 
Overall the interviews were conversational, thereby allowing the commonalities 
between the researcher and the researched to be expressed and the free flow of 
opinions and information to be adopted. 
 
The approach to analysing ‘fieldwork’ can take many forms, though Sarantakos 
(cited in Tolich et al. 1999 8) “characterises the process of qualitative data 
analysis as involving a cycle, [that involves] data collection – data reduction – 
data organisation – data interpretation … [and then back to] data collection”.  This 
cyclic approach can combine both inductive and deductive logic, because it 
develops from the empirical data of the research (Tolich et al. 1999).  This style 
of analysis of the interviews was chosen mainly for its simplicity and conciseness.  
Appropriately, following the end of the interviews the transcripts were read to 
identify the key areas and issues relevant to the research.  Included in this 
reduction of data were the confirmation of exact phraseology from one interview, 
and the completion of the transcript summaries.  Further to this, due to the 
information provided by one interviewee (previously referred to) additional 
information was collected, thereby continuing the cycle.  The next step was the 
data organisation, which involved the recognition of both the commonalities and 
differences apparent in the data.  Finally, the interpretation of the data was made 
and this is where explanations are presented and the conclusions are drawn. 
 
3.4.3 Discourse Analysis    
 
The methodological approach of discourse analysis is perhaps the most difficult to 
characterize, this is because the phrase ‘discourse analysis’ and what constitutes 
‘discourse’ is ambiguous.  For instance Howarth, (2000 3) states that “[f]or some, 
discourse … is a very narrow enterprise that concentrates on … utterance/s … 
[while] others see discourse as synonymous with the entire social system, in 
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which discourse literally constitute the social and political world”.  Fairclough, 
(1989) and Schiffrin, (1994) however, identify ‘discourse’ to be both speech and 
written text or any ‘language in use’.  This description of discourse is not only 
accepted by Flowerdew et al. (1997) but expanded upon.  They assert that as the 
‘field’ of social science research is now anything from a cinema to an art studio, 
then the ‘text’ (discourse) can be defined as a film or painting.  As such discourse 
could include all forms of communication (Flowerdew et al. 1997). 
 
There are also many ways to approach the analysis of discourse as Fairclough, 
(1995 viii) stipulates “… discourse analysis is not a ‘level’ of analysis …, but an 
exploration of how ‘text’ at all levels work within socio-cultural practices”.  This 
ambiguity of both what translates as discourse and discourse analysis continues 
with the actual methods or techniques employed to analyse discourse.  Although 
there are common ‘tools’ such as a computer programme that can be used to 
explore the information, the quality and nature of the data that is received depends 
on the software programme used.  An example of a programme is INVIVO text 
analysis which will show the researcher, depending on what the programme is 
asked to do, where and how many times specific words and/or phrases have been 
used in the text.  This method was not used in this research as primarily it would 
not have supplied the information required, but as mentioned earlier my 
knowledge of computer analysis software is limited.  Another method is ‘reflexive 
reading’ that basically means reading the text with a critical eye.  Theoretically 
the analysis that resulted from this technique would incorporate the values held by 
the researcher as previously acknowledged by Tolich (1999).  This is supported 
by Fairclough, (1992 8) who emphasizes that “as there is no set procedure for 
doing discourse analysis; people approach it in different ways according to the 
specific nature of the project, as well as their own views of discourse”.  Further to 
Fairclough’s statement, Gee, (1999 5) asserts that any technique used depends on 
the perspective of the researcher because as  
 
[a]ny method of research is a way to investigate some particular 
domain … people with different theories … will use different methods 
for their research … [as] methods [are] essentially … “tools of 
inquiry” and strategies … designed to describe and explain what the 
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researcher takes to exist [epistemology] and to be important in a 
domain.     
 
Additionally Gee, (1999 6) stresses that “[s]uch tools and strategies are 
continually and flexibly adapted to specific issues, problems, and contexts of 
study”.   Therefore, in accepting Fairclough’s and Gee’s premise, the contextual 
framework of this research is first and foremost an explanation of what is 
important to the domain.    Consequently, to begin with, the context chapter 
identifies the international and national legislation, policies and agreements that 
govern the use and protection of New Zealand’s coastal waters.  By recognizing 
this legislation the first objective of the research, being to establish what 
legislative measures have been taken to lessen the risk of an oil spill, will have 
been ascertained. 
 
The second objective is to substantiate the effectiveness of the both the proactive 
and reactive laws and/or policies for addressing marine oil spills.  To address this 
objective it is separated into two parts, firstly the relevant legislation, policies and 
agreements that pertain to oil pollution in the marine environment will be 
analysed to verify whether they are proactive or reactive.  The criterion for this 
determination, under this research, is ‘what initiated the laws or policies’ and is 
also presented in Chapter Four.  However, as most of the legislation, policies 
and/or agreements are applicable nationwide and ‘to substantiate the effectiveness 
of the … legislation’ the analysis of the two case studies in Chapter Six should 
conceivably illustrate whether these statutes are realized in a real-life context. 
 
Finally, ‘language’ can generate or support existing relationships and socio-
cultural practices and hence they can be a powerful tool in the construction and 
continuance of societies (Fairclough, 1989; Howarth, 2000).  To demonstrate, this 
research is analysing some of the environmental laws of New Zealand.  Although 
I am not specifically analysing words or phrases, though this may occur, in the 
discourse it should be noted that there is a power relationship between all 
legislation and the public.  Thus, one might consider that it does not matter what 
language is employed in the legislation as the community will obey the law.  
Conversely the language used, especially in environmental legislation, is usually 
words or phrases that will ensure, not only, the acceptance of the law by the 
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public, but also to ‘advance’ the society.   Depending on what your beliefs are this 
may not be a bad thing as laws are supposed to be for the ‘social good’ and here in 
New Zealand the ‘social good’ not only includes people of today but future 
generations.       
 
3.5 Chapter Summary       
 
This chapter introduced the difference between methodology, as the overall 
structure of the research and the methods as the mechanisms used to carry out the 
investigative task.   Under the research design an explanation was proffered of 
how the theories, such as Sustainable Development, influenced the decision of the 
methodological approaches chosen. How I position myself within the research and 
the idea of reflexivity was then discussed under the research limitations. The next 
section elaborated on the qualitative methodological approaches used and laid out 
the methods.  To maximise the answers to the thesis question and objectives the 
‘triangulation of data’ technique was employed.  This research device utilises two 
or more methodological approaches to secure as much information as possible.  
Accordingly, the three mechanisms, case studies, interviews and discourse 
analysis, were applied and the style of interpretation was considered.  Having 
substantiated both the research design and the methods used to collect the data the 
analysis, interpretation/discussion and conclusions are presented in Chapters Four 
to Six. 
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Chapter Four: Contextual Framework   
 
The purpose of this chapter is to ‘explain’ the legislation as it pertains to the 
‘particular domain’ of the research.   So to answer ‘how oil spills are prevented in 
New Zealand’s territorial waters?’ the first objective is to explore and define what 
precautionary legislation is in place to protect our marine environment from oil 
pollution.  I begin with the identification of international maritime agreements.  
The reason for this is that many of these universal treaties, due to the nature of the 
oceanic environment and the shipping industry, are the bases for New Zealand’s 
maritime legislation, which is described next.  In addition, the national legislation 
that focuses on marine oil spills will be analysed as to whether it is proactive or 
reactive, though this analysis will only be realised in Chapter Six when the two 
case studies are evaluated.  Prior to presenting New Zealand’s current legal 
maritime regime, a synopsis of how nation-states began co-operating on 
environmental legislation and a brief outline of how worldwide maritime law was 
established are advanced.   
 
4.1 Introduction    
 
Over the last four decades, ecological threats and some considerable 
environmental disasters have guaranteed that one of the main issues on all 
political agendas of industrialised economies is environmental sustainability.   
This ‘awareness’ of ecological damage, initially was on a local basis and in the 
sixties part of the damage from pesticides, was air and water pollution.  Though 
these problems did not disappear, other more destructive ecological crises 
developed and became more wide-spread.  For instance, in the seventies nuclear 
radiation and other toxic waste dumping generally received the greatest attention, 
whereas by the eighties it was the denuding of rainforests, fish stock depletion and 
the ‘hole in the ozone’.  Finally, through the nineties and into the 21st century, 
international environmental issues such as global warming/climate change, 
biodiversity/biosecurity and the waste of and pollution of resources became of 
primary concern (Hewison, 1994; Williams, 1997).  Nevertheless, until the mid-
eighties many industrialised nations, especially in Europe, still acted 
independently with regard to environmental preservation and protection.  The 
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Chernobyl disaster changed this concept, as acknowledged by President von 
Wiezsacker of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1986. 
 
The accident at Chernobyl dramatically brought home to us the need 
for close international co-operation …  The repercussions of the 
accident for large areas of Europe convinced even the last sceptics that 
frontiers between countries, alliances or political systems become 
completely insignificant in  the  event  of … [environmental]  
disasters.  They do not afford the least protection.  They must 
therefore not impede the requisite cross-frontier action … (Hohmann, 
1994 xvii). 
 
Thus, Chernobyl and other environmental disasters have consolidated the idea that 
once autonomous nation-states have to work together to stop the destruction of the 
environment.  This wider acceptance that environmental problems could no longer 
be seen or dealt with in isolation ensured the growth of many new, and the 
revalidation of other, Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEA)1 or treaty’s 
(Fischer et al. 1995; Hohmann, 1994).  Though these treaties have not worked 
(yet) for many of the more serious and collective environmental problems, like 
biodiversity and global warming, some have been effective on several of the less 
daunting human-produced dangers to the natural world.  One of these is the 
actuality of oil spills in the marine environment, which have lessened over the 
years through the implementation of collective maritime laws. 
 
Before many of these laws were instigated the principles of ‘mare liberum’ 
(freedom of the seas) and ‘res nullius’ (nobody’s property) had been 
internationally accepted for at least four hundred years (Falque et al. 2002).  Over 
the last two centuries however, due to increasing human population and 
                                                 
1 Under international law, MEAs are the predominant model used to enable countries to work 
collectively on regional and worldwide environmental issues.  Depending on the content, 
seriousness and/or previous international legislation, an MEA can be structured as either “hard-
law” or “soft-law”.  Hard-law MEAs constitute legally-binding agreements and actions that if 
disregarded by a participatory nation-state, said country can be held accountable for the 
contravention through an international court of law.  In comparison soft-law MEAs are not legally-
binding, but rather provide a sense of ‘moral obligation’ to the participatory country (Hewison, 
1994; Williams, 1997).  New Zealand has ratified both types of MEAs and assimilated many of the 
rights and obligations from these various accords into national legislation (Ministry for the 
Environment (MfE), 2006).   
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technological advances in reaping marine resources, the idea of the oceans being a 
‘global common’ was being undermined by some nations who were claiming 
ownership of the marine environment. Upon recognizing this, the United Nations 
convened the first conference on the ‘Law of the Sea’ (LOS) in 1958.  The 
conference initiated comprehensive international laws to regulate and standardise 
the use of, and to lessen the abuse of, the world's oceans and seas which upon 
signing then ratifying2, all participatory nations would abide by.  The outcome of 
the conference was four ‘Geneva conventions’ that were titled the ‘United Nations 
Conventions on the Law of the Sea’ or better known now as UNCLOS I (IUCN, 
1995; David et al. 1997). 
 
Since UNCLOS I and the subsequent UNCLOS II and due to disputes regarding 
oceanic ‘claims of dominion’ and the amplification of environmental issues, 
which necessitated governing legislation, another conference was convened.  The 
outcome of this symposium in 1982 was UNCLOS III, which entered into force in 
1994.  This third convention on the LOS, especially, provides international 
legitimacy for governance arrangements of the seas and oceans and because New 
Zealand has ratified UNCLOS III in 1995 this convention is fundamental to New 
Zealand’s marine management (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), 
1997). 
 
4.2 International Maritime Agreements  
 
Under UNCLOS III, New Zealand has both powers and responsibilities for the 
seas that we claim through sovereignty. These ocean domains or offshore zones 
are executed in New Zealand legislation through the Territorial Sea, Contiguous 
Zone and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977 and are; 
 
• a territorial sea of up to 12 nautical miles (nm); 
• a contiguous zone of up to 24 nm; 
 
                                                 
2 “Treatises [in this instance MEAs] come into force and effect at international level according to 
their own terms.  In some cases … simply on signature … [though for] more important or complex 
treatise, the final acceptance … may require substantial changes in governmental policy or 
national law … [thus] the text being established by signature … [does] not become binding until 
further action is taken by the state in question … commonly referred to as ratification … or 
acceptance or approval or accession” (MFAT, 1997 17) (emphasis in original). 
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• an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of up to 200 nm; and 
• the continental shelf (beyond the EEZ, but not beyond 350 nm).  
 
For New Zealand these ‘offshore zones’ represent 4.1 million sq. kms of ocean 
and seabed to use, but also to conserve. Generally the most sensitive and fragile 
marine ecosystems are within the boundaries of the territorial sea and along the 
coastline, which in New Zealand corresponds to approximately 15,000 kms of 
coastline and several groups/large offshore islands (Rennie, 1993).  The other 
reality is that the coast is where the most human interaction and activity with the 
marine environment occurs.  So although coastal nations have sovereign rights 
over the resources within the 200 nm EEZ, UNCLOS III moderates these rights 
with the obligation to protect and conserve both the oceanic domain and its 
natural inhabitants.  Therefore, as the obligations of LOS (I, II and III) that relate 
to the preservation and protection of the marine environment are the foundation of 
many past and future international marine conservation agreements, the two key 
convention principles germane to the research topic are summarised.  
 
4.2.1 UNCLOS III - The General Principles for the Preservation  
       and Protection of the Marine Environment  
 
The preservation and protection of the marine environment encapsulates many 
areas of possible destruction or damage from over-fishing to sand and seabed 
mining.  This thesis however concentrates on oil pollution in the marine 
environment thus UNCLOS III’s section on marine pollution is of primary 
interest.  Firstly, it is appropriate to define pollution.  Under Article 1.4 of the 
LOS convention, pollution of the marine environment means; 
 
[T]he introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or 
energy into the marine environment, including estuaries, which results 
or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as to harm living 
resources and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to 
marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the 
sea, and impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of 
amenities (IUCN, 1995 35).      
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This is an expanded definition of pollution from previous LOS conventions as 
there was a need to incorporate new pollutants such as those under ‘indirect’ 
human introduction and ‘energy’.  Further to this the convention required the 
inclusion of the ‘precautionary principle’ and accordingly added ‘likely to’ with 
respect to the introduction of substances that result in deleterious effects (IUCN, 
1995).  Thus, a primary obligation is to prevent, reduce and control pollution.  
Accordingly, coastal states ought to anticipate and hopefully avoid marine 
pollution, but if unavoidable reduce or control it.  This principle also clarifies the 
types of pollution.  These comprises: ‘use of technologies’ and the introduction of 
new or alien species and toxic, harmful or noxious substances from land based 
sources, vessels and offshore installations.  Under this ‘duty of care’ if pollution 
occurs, monitoring, assessment and reporting to the UN may be required (UN, 
2005). 
 
The other key general principle involves the ‘response to marine pollution 
emergencies’.  Should there be imminent or actual pollution from a vessel 
accident on the high seas a maritime nation may take protective action to prevent 
damage to its coastline or related interests.  In addition the country must notify 
any neighbouring states that may also be in danger of being polluted and the 
relevant international organisations.  Finally, the neighbouring states are to 
cooperate in the cleanup of the pollution and in preventing or minimising the 
damage (UN, 2005).  Under this principle, the International Convention on Oil 
Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, 1990 (OPRC) and the South 
Pacific Regional Environmental Program (SPREP) New Zealand has a reciprocal 
arrangement with Australia via a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).  The 
intergovernmental cooperation can include assisting in an oil spill cleanup and 
aiding in the identification and possible detention of the perpetrator of small 
and/or non-accidental oil spills (Hewison, 1994).   
 
Although this principle now incorporates all substances that could ‘leak’ from a 
ship, its predecessor the 1969 International Convention Relating to Intervention 
on the High Seas in case of Oil Pollution Casualties was originally concerned 
with oil spills from tankers.  Though as the title of this convention suggests 
‘casualties’ included the crew and vessel and therefore the 1969 treaty was one of 
a number of international treaties that mandated vessel safety at sea.  The reason 
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many maritime treaties include protection for ship personnel is that when the 
United Nations was established in 1948 they founded the first institution to 
promote ‘ship safety’ world-wide (IUCN, 1995).  This administrative body, now 
known as the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), was created specifically 
to manage the formulation and implementation of a legal and institutional 
framework for maritime safety.  Initially this agency of the United Nations was 
only concerned with improving the safety of maritime operations and this still 
remains its chief responsibility.  Nevertheless, over time and with increasing 
global maritime trade and the nearly universal drive for environmental protection, 
other concerns regarding vessels and the marine environment required attention.  
The IMO, as one of the leading maritime institutions, incorporated these ‘new 
problems’ and realized them in Article 1 (a) of the organisation’s convention as 
summarised below; 
 
The purposes of the organisation is to “provide machinery for 
cooperation among Governments in the field of governmental 
regulation and practices relating to technical matters  of  all  kinds 
affecting  shipping  engaged in international trade; to encourage and 
facilitate the general adoption of the highest  practicable   standards  in  
matters   concerning  maritime  safety, efficiency  of navigation  and  
prevention  and control of marine  pollution from ships”. The 
organisation is also empowered to deal with administrative and legal 
matters related to these purposes (IMO, 2004 1). 
 
With this mandate the IMO, under the auspices of the UN, has implemented 
several major hard-law MEAs to counteract the pollution of the world's oceans.  
The first was the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping 
of Waste and Other Matter, better known as the London Convention and was 
adopted in December 1972 (David et al. 1997). 
 
4.2.2 The London Convention     
 
The main objective of the London Convention is to prevent and control the 
dumping of waste and other matter at sea and originated because there was an 
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increasing amount of industrial waste being disposed of into the oceans and seas.  
The Convention defines dumping as follows; 
 
[A]ny deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter from vessels 
aircraft, platforms or other  man-made structures … but does not 
include  disposal  of  wastes   incidental  to,  or  derived  from  normal 
operations  of  vessels,  aircraft,  platforms  or  other  man-made 
structures, or placement of  matter  in  the sea for a purpose other than 
disposal (Hewison, 1994 19). 
 
Initially the Convention only sought to restrict the discarding of waste that was 
known to be harmful to the marine environment.  Nevertheless, with the advent of 
the precautionary view the Convention requires that, unless it is proven to be 
harmless and there is no alternative, all dumping at sea is to be terminated.  Under 
a ‘list’ system of three annexes, the Convention defines what constitutes waste to 
the marine environment and the factors relating to oceanic disposal.  Annex I lists 
the waste that is ‘absolutely prohibited’ from being disposed of at sea and these 
include mercury, high-level radioactive waste and oil.  Annex II states the waste 
materials such as arsenic, fluorides and lead that require a special dumping permit.  
Finally, Annex III catalogues the requirements necessary if a permit, either special 
or general, is to be granted.   These permits are to be issued by the national 
authority in whose domain the dumping is to be done (David et al. 1997).  In New 
Zealand the granting of ‘dumping’ permits was originally authorised by the 
Ministry of Transport however with the enactment of the RMA in 1991, a 
resource management consent is now obligatory for dumping within the limit of 
the Territorial Sea (Hewison, 1994). 
 
Though New Zealand did ratify the London Convention, in 1975, we were only 
one of 63 countries to do so.  David et al. (1997) considers that this lack of 
worldwide commitment has ensured that oceanic dumping of waste is still not as 
controlled as it could be.  This view may have been rectified as due to the 
subsequent ratification of UNCLOS III, support for the London Convention has 
been achieved through the following axioms:  
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• clarification of the rights of coastal states to prohibit dumping off 
their shores; 
• requires states to enact measures domestically that are at least as 
effective as the global requirements; and 
• encourages more states to participate in the international regime 
(Broadus et al. 1994 229). 
 
For those states that did accept the London Convention another part of their 
obligation is to any regional agreements coordinated under the Convention.  For 
New Zealand this meant the ratification of the Protocol for the Prevention of 
Pollution of the South Pacific Region by Dumping 1986 and it came into force 
here in August 1990 (Hewison, 1994).  This Protocol requests the same 
requirements as the London Convention, though the area covered by the Protocol 
is set by the Convention for the Protection of Natural Resources and Environment 
in the South Pacific Region under SPREP and includes New Zealand.  
 
4.2.3 MARPOL 73/78 
 
Nearly a year after the adoption of the London Convention, the IMO introduced 
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973, 
more widely recognised as MARPOL.  The MARPOL Convention never entered 
into force and eventually it was amended to the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships.  This 
Protocol absorbed the Convention and is now known as MARPOL 73/78.  It 
entered into force in October 1983 and by 1989 only 52 states had signed the 
Protocol (Hewison, 1994).  It is unclear as to whether New Zealand was one of 
the initial signatories to the Protocol, and my various attempts to clarify this point 
and to determine the date that New Zealand ratified the Protocol have only been 
semi-successful.  From the information received, from several government 
departments, New Zealand has ratified parts of MARPOL 73/78.  As detailed 
below the Protocol is broken up into annexes of the main types of marine 
pollution from ships and the MSA provided the 25 September 1998 as the date 
New Zealand accepted Annex I of the Protocol (Lane, 2006 (pers. com.)).  Of the 
other five annexes, New Zealand is a party to Annex II, III and V though no ‘date 
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of ratification’ of these annexes was discovered by the time this thesis went to 
print (Richardson, 2006 (per. com.)).  
 
The MARPOL Protocol’s objective is “to preserve the marine environment 
through the complete elimination of pollution by oil and other harmful substances 
and the minimisation of accidental discharge of such substances” (IMO, 2004 1).  
Again, MARPOL 73/78 was not the first treaty to prevent oil pollution.  The 
forerunner was the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the 
Sea by Oil 1954 (OILPOL).  New Zealand ratified this treaty and the 1962 
Amendment in June 1971 and both became effective in New Zealand from 
September 1971 and were implemented through the Marine Pollution Act 1974 
(Nolan et al. 2005). 
 
Furthermore in 1976, New Zealand endorsed the 1969 Amendment to OILPOL 
which entered into force in 1978.  This convention was primarily concerned with, 
and focused on, oil pollution that resulted from routine tanker operations, which 
were considered the major cause of marine oil pollution at the time.  MARPOL 
73/78 recognised that operational discharges of oil were not the only causes of 
marine pollution from ships.  As a result, the Protocol has six annexes, each to 
provide the regulations to prevent and control specific pollution from vessels and 
each with its own ‘entry into force’ date.  As oil pollution is of interest, this is the 
only annex that is considered in detail (Box Five).   
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As these annexes show, it can take decades for the implementation of measures to 
prevent and/or control pollution of the marine environment, but New Zealand has 
consistently demonstrated over a long period a commitment to address such 
issues.  One of the main reasons, for delays in agreement and implementation, is 
the time and costs necessary to allow the shipping industry to adopt or adapt to 
new criterion.  The standards can include new equipment (both on the vessels and 
at the ports), new operating methods, new construction standards for ships and 
even new guidelines on officer-crew communication and training (IMO, 2004).  
One of the most effective amendments to MARPOL 73/78, in minimising major 
oil spills from vessel accidents, was to declare that all new oil tankers would be 
built with double hulls3 this included all oil tankers under construction at the time 
(Falque et al. 2002).   
 
While the new standard for tanker construction (double hulls) was modified under 
MARPOL 73/78 it was in accordance with another IMO treaty established in 1990 
which is the ‘International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response 
and Cooperation 1990 (OPRC).  The goal of this Convention is for coastal states 
to “recognise the serious threat to the marine environment by oil pollution … [and 
                                                 
3 “A double hull is a ship hull design and construction method where the bottom and sides of the 
ship have two complete layers of watertight hull surface:  one outer layer forming the normal hull 
of the ship, and a second inner hull which is … further into the ship … [by] a few feet, which 
forms a … barrier to seawater in case the outer hull is damaged and leaks” (Wikipedia, 2006 1). 
Box Five                         MARPOL 73/78 Annexes
 
Annex I:  Prevention of Pollution by Oil (Entry into Force – 2 October 1983) 
   Oil operational discharges from ships are allowed only when all of the following  
                 conditions are met;        
o the total quantity of oil which a vessel may discharge … whilst under way 
        must not exceed 1/30,000 of  the total cargo carrying capacity of the vessel; 
o the rate at which the oil may be discharged must not exceed 60 litres per  
        mile travelled by ship; and 
o no discharge of any oil … within 50 miles of the nearest land.  
 
Annex  II:  Control of Pollution by Noxious Liquid Substances  
     (Entry into Force - 6 April 1987) 
 
Annex III:  Prevention of Pollution by Harmful Substances in Packaged Form  
                    (Entry into Force- 1 July 1992) 
 
Annex IV:  Prevention of Pollution by Sewage from Ships  
     (Entry into Force - 27 September 2003) 
 
Annex  V:   Prevention of Pollution by Garbage from Ships 
     (Entry into Force - 31 December 1988) (Hewison, 1994 20). 
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to be] mindful of the importance of precautionary measures and prevention to 
avoid oil pollution in the first instance” (Cameron, 1993 5-6).   Accordingly, the 
standards of this convention are preventative to ensure the environmental threat is 
not realized.  While New Zealand is a party to OPRC, the Convention (for New 
Zealand) only came into effect on the 2nd of October 1999, which is indicative that 
despite New Zealand’s ongoing commitment to the London Convention and 
OILPOL, this particular convention was not a high priority for implementation 
(Richardson, 2006 (pers. com.)).   
 
4.2.4 Oil Pollution Liability    
 
The last international treaty specifically concerning oil pollution that New 
Zealand has ratified is the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage (as amended) 1969 (CLC).  The CLC entered into force in 
1975, though it was not effective in New Zealand until July 1976.  As the title of 
the Convention implies the costs of an oil spill, (the clean-up, environmental 
and/or economic damage) is a private liability and as such will belong to the 
registered owner of the oil tanker involved (David et al. 1997; MfE, 2005).   
 
Both the CLC 1969 and the supplementary Fund Convention 19714 were inter-
governmentally initiated programmes that put the onus of liability on the owner of 
the vessel to recompense the victims of a major oil spill (David et al. 1997).  It 
should be noted however, that prior to the CLC and the Fund Convention, two 
voluntary compensation schemes were instigated by oil tanker and oil cargo 
owners to provide reparation for large spills.  These funds were the Tanker 
Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution 1968 
(TOVALOP) and the Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker 
Liability for Oil Pollution 1968 (CRISTAL).  Upon the approval of the CLC and 
the Fund Convention, the TOVALOP and CRISTAL shifted to being ‘additional’ 
compensation should the costs exceed both the CLC and Fund Convention 
                                                 
4 “The Fund Convention was established to supplement the CLC … [as] it was … perceived that 
the CLC limits might not provide full compensation for the victims of oil pollution where there 
was a large oil spill … The Fund Convention  supplements the amount available under the CLC 
where there … [is] “pollution damage”, which is defined in the same way as under the CLC, and, 
either no liability arises under the CLC or the [liable] ship owner  … is financially unable to meet 
its obligations … [or the compensation] exceeds the limit of the ship owners liability under the 
CLC” (David et al. 1997 337).     
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restitution (Broadus et al, 1994).  Eventually, with the growth and general 
acceptance of the CLC and Fund Convention, the TOVALOP and CRISTAL 
schemes ceased in 1997.  New Zealand did not ratify the Fund Convention until it 
become apparent that the TOVALOP and CRISTAL funds were to be terminated.  
The reason was that with the eventual discontinuation of these private schemes 
there would be a significant loss of protection against oil spills if countries did not 
ratify the Fund Convention.  Thus, New Zealand accepted the treaty and 
incorporated the Fund Convention into its legislation through the Maritime 
Transport Act 1994 (MTA) (David et al. 1997).  
 
4.2.5 Soft-Law MEAs: Rio Earth Summit  
 
The 1992 Rio Earth Summit (UNCED) produced two major morally binding soft-
law MEAs: the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and Agenda 
21.  The Rio Declaration consists of 27 guiding principles of which 7, 11, 15 and 
16 (Box Six) are most relevant to this research.   
 
 
 
Box Six   Selected Principles from the Rio Declaration 
         on Environment and Development 
 
The following principles are considered especially pertinent to the research objectives of  
 this thesis: 
 
Principle 7:  States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, 
protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem… 
  
Principle 11:  States shall enact effective environmental legislation.  
Environmental standards, management objectives and priorities should reflect 
the environmental and development context to which they apply …  
Principle 15:  In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach 
shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities.  Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not 
be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation (UNEP, 2006 3). 
Principle 16:  National authorities should endeavour to promote internalization 
of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account 
the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution with 
due regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade and 
investment (UNEP, 2006 4).  
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Of the 27 principles many existed, either wholly or partially, in previous hard-law 
MEAs that New Zealand had ratified, such as the CLC (Principle 16).  New 
Zealand had also initiated Principle 11, and aspects of Principle 15 and 22 by 
enacting the RMA, a year prior to the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development.  
 
Whereas the Río Declaration is a general set of guidelines, Agenda 21 is a 40 
chapter comprehensive ‘plan of action’, with some 2000 recommendations, to be 
deployed at global, regional, national and local levels.  The ‘plan’ is based on and 
exemplified the Sustainable Development ideology popularised by Brundtland 
(WCED, 1987), but was open to both Strong and Weak Sustainability 
interpretations.  Of the 40 chapters, Chapter 17 - Protection of the Oceans, all 
kinds of Seas, including Enclosed and Semi-enclosed Seas, and Coastal Areas and 
the Protection, Rational Use and Development of their Living Resources, is 
especially pertinent to this thesis.  This chapter advocates “integrated management 
and sustainable development of coastal and marine areas, including exclusive 
economic zones” (UN, 2002 17-1).  Further to this all-encompassing directive, 
Chapter 17 is then divided into specific areas of ‘concern’.  Consequently, 
Sections B and D together provide a “basis for action” to deal with Marine 
Environmental Protection from oil spills.  Marine oil pollution and ‘critical natural 
capital’ are the basis for action (Box Seven).       
 
 
 
Box Seven   Agenda 21 – Basis for Action
 
17.18   Degradation of the marine environment can result from a wide range of 
sources … maritime transport and dumping-at-sea activities contribute 10% 
each.  The contaminants that pose the greatest threat to the main arena 
environment are … oil/hydrocarbons…  
 
17.20 Marine pollution is also caused by shipping and sea-based activities.  
Approximately 600,000 tonnes of oil enter the oceans each year as a result of 
normal shipping operations, accidents and illegal discharges … (UN, 2002 17 4). 
 
 17.72 … other marine and coastal habitats … are among the most highly    
diverse, integrated and productive of the Earth’s ecosystems.  They often serve 
important ecological functions, … and are critical resources for food, energy, 
tourism … and such marine and coastal systems are under stress or are 
threatened from a variety of sources, both human and natural (UN, 2002 17-11). 
 54
 
The objectives, such as the preservation of rare or fragile ecosystems, are 
followed by a list of harmful ‘activities’ and the recommendations to nullify them 
(Box Eight) (UN, 2002).  To conclude, the governments that adopted Agenda 21, 
and nearly 180 of the nations attending the Earth Summit did so, undertook to 
implement through national policies and procedures this ‘outline for sustainable 
development’ (MfE, 2006).  
 
 
 
4.2.6 Summary of International Treaties 
 
While New Zealand has signed both of the above soft-law MEAs and has begun 
applying their principles and/or recommendations it is the hard-law treaties that 
New Zealand has ratified that the government is legally required to give effect to.  
Before progressing to our domestic maritime legislation it should be noted that 
some view ratification of hard-law treaties entails a loss of New Zealand 
sovereignty.  However, ratification usually implies an expectation that the benefits 
outweigh the obligations (Caughley, 2001). 
 
 
 
   
Box Eight   Agenda 21 – Several Recommendations  
 
17.18 and 17.20   
• Apply preventative, precautionary and anticipatory approaches so as to avoid 
degradation of the marine environment … reduce the risk of long-term or 
irreversible adverse effects;   
• Ensure prior assessment of activities … significant adverse impacts.  Integrate 
protection of marine environment into relevant general environmental, social and 
economic development policies;   
• Develop economic incentives … to apply clean technologies … consistent with 
‘polluter pays’ and internalization of environmental costs (UN, 2002 17 4). 
17.72 
• Maintain or restore populations of marine species … sustainable yield …; 
• Promote the development use of selective fishing gear and practices that minimize 
waste … by-catch of non-target species; 
•  Protect and restore endangered marine species; 
• Preserve rare or fragile ecosystems, as well as habitats and other ecologically 
sensitive areas (UN, 2002 17-11).
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4.3 New Zealand’s Coastal and Marine Legislation   
 
The main reasons for much of New Zealand’s domestic legislation regarding the 
marine environment are that firstly, it forms an essential part of New Zealanders’ 
national identity.  Not only do New Zealander’s receive significant recreational 
and aesthetic benefits, but the marine environment provides many economic 
opportunities.  Secondly, due to our geographical isolation, many of the more than 
15,000 marine species found in New Zealand's Territorial Sea and Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) are endemic to our waters and therefore require a higher 
standard of protection (DOC, 2000; MfE, 2005).  
 
New Zealand has three tiers of government: central, regional and territorial each 
with its own area of responsibility and jurisdiction, though these do overlap.  The 
two primary administrative areas of relevance to the management of oil spills are 
the coastal marine area (CMA) and the EEZ.  The CMA is the seabed and the 
water column between the line at mean high water at spring tides and the 12nm 
limit of the Territorial Sea.  It is chiefly administered by regional councils in 
conjunction with the Minister of Conservation under the Resource Management 
Act 1991 (RMA).  The CMA also includes the areas in which marine reserves can 
be established5 and is a subset of the EEZ which extends to 200nm and for which 
a variety of agencies have various administrative responsibilities (Figure Six). 
                                                                                                                                         
                                                 
5 Marine Reserves are developed as no-take areas for scientific purposes.  They are created by the 
Governor General in Council on the recommendation of the Minister of Conservation under the 
Marine Reserves Act 1971. 
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Figure Six:  Schematic overview of jurisdictional boundaries of key statutes 
                      (MfE, 2002 17).   
 
However, the Ministry of Transport and its agency the Maritime Safety Authority 
(MSA)6 are responsible for shipping and oil spills in the EEZ except where 
primary administration lies with regional councils under the RMA.  Accordingly, 
                                                 
6 The Maritime Safety Authority changed its title to Maritime New Zealand in July 2005, as most 
of the information received from this organisation was collected while the organisation was the 
MSA this acronym will be continued throughout the thesis. 
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this review begins with the existing national legislative and policy framework and 
then summarizes the requirements of regional council and coastal plans and 
policies.   
 
4.3.1 Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA)      
 
The background to the RMA and its marine provisions are well traversed 
elsewhere. Memon et al. (1995 109) note that “… [this] new planning legislation 
is the product of two quite distinct and contradictory, socio-political forces, 
notably the New Right and the environmental movement … [which] signals a 
paradigmatic shift in planning ideology and perhaps practice”.  As a result the 
RMA blends free market ideals of minimal government interference with a focus 
on avoiding, remedying or mitigating affects of activities on the environment.  
This merging of policy objectives warranted a different approach to planning and 
as such “the new RMA adopted the principle of “effects-based” planning.   Rules 
in plans were to be based not on activities, but on environmental effects” (Rennie, 
2006 512).  Some believe (New Right advocates) that “… the weight given to the 
biospheric dimension of the human environment … means that socioeconomic 
needs of … society are weakly inscribed in the RMA” (Memon et al. 1995 121).  
For others (environmentalists) this shift to “sustainable management” is the 
purpose of the RMA (Box Nine), is necessary for ecological sustainability and 
arguably represents the Sustainability Imperative (Bosselmann et al. 2002: 
Randerson, 1997). 
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“The functions, powers and duties of the RMA, relegated to central and local 
government are structured to provide a cascading hierarchy where the lower levels 
of plans must not be inconsistent with higher level policy statements and plans” 
(Rennie,  2006 516).  The highest of these policies is the New Zealand Coastal 
Box Nine          Sections of the RMA of significance to this Thesis    
 
 
s.5(2) In this Act, “sustainable management” means managing the use, 
development, and protection of natural and physical resources in a way, or at a 
rate, which enables people and communities to provide for their social, 
economic, and cultural well-being and for their health and safety while  
(a) Sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources (excluding 
minerals) to meet the reasonable foreseeable needs of future generations; 
and 
(b) Safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and 
ecosystems; and   
(c) Avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on the 
environment. 
 
Additionally, Part II of the RMA contains s.6 – Matters of National Importance and s.7- Other 
Matters, both reinforce the purposes and principles of the Act.  These sections state that; In 
achieving the purposes of this Act, all persons exercising functions and powers under it, in 
relation to managing the use, development, and protection of natural and physical resources 
shall …  
 
s.6 … recognise and provide for the following matters of national importance:  
(a) The preservation of the natural character of the coastal environment (including  
    the coastal marine area) … 
(b) The protection of outstanding natural features and landscapes from  
    in-appropriate … use 
(c) The protection of areas of … significant habitats of indigenous [flora] and   
    fauna … 
(d) The relationship of Maori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral  
    lands, water, sites, waahi tapu (sacred sites) and other taonga (treasures).   
 
s.7 … have particular regard to: 
    (c)      The maintenance and enhancement of amenity values  
    (d)      Intrinsic values of ecosystems 
(e) Recognition and protection of the heritage value of sites… places or areas …   
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Policy Statement (NZCPS) issued in 1994.  As an instrument of the RMA (s.57), 
the NZCPS’s preparation and recommendations fall to the Minister of 
Conservation.  The objective of be NZCPS (Policy or Statement) is to promote the 
purpose of the RMA in relation to New Zealand’s coastal environment and it 
provides integrated guidance across the line of MHWS and between adjacent 
authorities.  The NZCPS policy statements most directly connected to oil spills 
(Box Ten) relate to preservation of natural character, controlling development and 
discharges, and identifying when and where activities or their effects must be 
treated as of such national significance that permission for them to occur can only 
be given by the Minister of Conservation (called Restricted Coastal Activities 
(RCAs)).  Also decisions under the RMA, except those of the Minister of 
Conservation, may be appealed to a specialist Environment Court.  
   
The Minister of Conservation also approves all ‘regional coastal plans’ (RCP).  It 
is of interest to note here, that initially there was a suggestion that regional 
councils include sites of ‘significant conservation value’ in their plans although it 
has now been decided that they do not have to.  This is particularly relevant as 
marine reserves ontologically could be expected to be automatically areas of 
‘significant conservation value’ and consequently certain activities, such as 
Box Ten       NZCPS policy statements most applicable to the research  
 
Chapter 1:  Preservation of the natural character 
o National priority to preserve natural character 
o Protect features which are essential or important characteristics of 
the coast … [significant conservation value] 
 
Chapter 3:  Activities involving … development … of the coastal environment 
o Identify areas important to the region/district and provide special 
protection 
o Avoid adverse effects as far as practicable, and where not 
practicable mitigate or remedy 
o Precautionary approach must be used … 
 
Chapter 5:  The matters to be included in Regional Coastal Plans  
o No discharge may give rise to any significant adverse effect … 
o Reduce contamination caused by trade wastes 
 
Schedule 1:  The circumstances in which activities that have a significant 
       or irreversible adverse effect on the CMA will be made “Restricted 
Coastal  
       Activities” (RCA) 
o Petroleum/Chemical Structures 
o Depositing substances 
o Discharge …  
(DOC, 2004)
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shipping, in and possibly near such a site might be considered a RCA.  If this were 
the case then the decision, on what activities to allow in and/or near a marine 
reserve, would arguably be the Minister of Conservation’s7.  The implications of 
this will be considered in Chapter Six.  
 
The original RMA however, did not expressly curtail the discharging, dumping or 
incinerating of waste in the CMA.  Thus, a 1994 amendment to the RMA (s.15B) 
did clearly prohibit these activities however it was not until the 1997 amendment 
to the RMA that devolved the power to regional councils for control.  The 
Councils enforce s.15B (Box Eleven) via the coastal planning and permitting 
regime.  The amendment essentially prohibited discharges unless allowed by a 
rule in the RCP or a coastal permit was obtained and made the actions subject to 
s.5 of the Act (Bosselmann et al. 2002).   
 
 
 
4.3.1a Evaluation of RMA    
 
The RMA officially integrates environmental management to ensure the 
sustainability of New Zealand's resources not only for the use and enjoyment of 
the present generation but also future generations.  Although the Act does not 
specifically mention the Precautionary Principle it is implied through the 
‘avoiding, remedying or mitigation’ of any adverse effects from any proposed 
                                                 
7 James and Rennie (2003) describe a similar approach to the organisation of cruise ship 
management in Fiordland.  This is based on a successful argument that coastal permits might be 
required for shipping, but they suggest that this might not be correct and was not tested in the 
courts.     
Box Eleven  Discharges of harmful substances from ships 
or off shore installations 
 
s.15B. (1) No person may, in the coastal marine area, discharge a harmful substance or 
contaminant, from a ship or offshore installation into water … unless-  
 
(a)The discharge is permitted or controlled by regulations made under this Act, a rule in a 
regional coastal plan, proposed regional coastal plan, regional plan, proposed regional plan, or 
a resource consent; or … 
 
 (3) Where regulations are made under this Act permitting or controlling a discharge to which 
subsections (1) … apply, no rule can be included in a regional coastal plan, proposed regional 
coastal plan, regional plan, or proposed regional plan, or a resource consent granted relating to 
that discharge unless the regulations provide otherwise; and regulations may be made 
prohibiting the making of rules or the granting of resource consents for discharges.    
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activity on the environment (Rennie, 2006 514).  Hence, both ‘sustainable 
management’ (as the Sustainable Imperative) and the ‘precautionary principle’ are 
fundamental approaches that underpin New Zealand’s management of the marine 
environment through the RMA. 
 
A provision of my methodology was to analyse the national legislation as to 
whether it was proactive or reactive.  My assessment of the RMA is that it is both.  
The basis for this is that the motivation for the Act could be considered reactive 
due to the persuasion of internal and external forces, such as New Right activists, 
UN treaties or WCED.  This is reinforced by the addition of s.15B through the 
1994 amendment.  However, the actual and implicit purpose and principles are 
proactive.  An example of this is the effects on the bio-physical environment, 
when assessed are often given greater weight than other socio-economic 
considerations.  Specifically in the marine environment unless permission has 
been granted by either a resource consent or a rule in a plan, or the substance 
discharged is harmless, then it can not be discharged.  In other words the default 
assumption is prohibitive. 
 
Although the main ‘protectionist’ jurisprudence, with regard to New Zealand’s 
marine environs, is the RMA the Maritime Transport Act 1994 and various other 
‘purpose explicit’ legislation also have responsibilities within in the Territorial 
Sea and beyond.   
  
4.3.2 Maritime Transport Act 1994 (MTA) 
 
The MTA (Act) came into effect over several years and superseded at least two 
other maritime statutes, one being the Marine Pollution Act 1974 (MSA, 1995).  
The 1994 Act was a result of the recognition given to the coastal marine 
environment by the RMA via s.6 (a) as formerly described.  The MTA 
substantially improved upon the previous maritime safety standards and 
procedures and the regulations governing the protection of the oceanic domain.  
Furthermore the MTA places a greater ‘duty of care’ onto the shipping industry, 
both towards its people and the environment (David et al. 1997).  The Act 
maintains the MSA (Authority) as the primary agency for implementing the MTA. 
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The statutory framework of the Act basically divides responsibility into three 
main areas being; ‘Maritime Rules’, ‘Marine Protection Rules’ and ‘Emergency 
Maritime and Emergency Protection Rules’ (MSA, 1996).  All three divisions 
stem from and incorporate the many international conventions and protocols that 
New Zealand has either signed, ratified or consider appropriate to employ with 
regards to the marine environment (David et al. 1997; Wallace, 1996).  An 
example of this is the incorporation of four of the six annexes of MARPOL 73/78 
into the Marine Protection Rules which is seen by the MSA as further 
safeguarding the sea from most types of ship pollution.  The Maritime Rules, s. 
34, 36, 39, 40 of the Act, govern the technical, procedural and documentary 
standards for the navigation and operation of ships.  Next the Marine Protection 
Rules, covered under s. 386 to 393, detail the protection of the marine 
environment.  Apart from the overall rules, certain areas of concern are specified.  
These include the dumping and incineration of waste; controls on toxic substance; 
and the Marine Oil Spill Response Strategy and Contingency Plans.  The Act 
actualizes a tier system to respond to marine oil spills and the responsibility for 
clean-up (Box Twelve). 
 
Although the tier system points out who is responsible in each area, it does not 
quantify the size of the spill, which would shift the authority (for the clean-up) 
from one category to another.  The reason for this is that responsibility depends 
on the amount and type of oil, the location of the spill, and the answerable party’s 
Box Twelve             New Zealand’s Four Tier Marine Oil Spill Planning 
                                       and Response Strategy (after MSA, 1995 27)    
 
Tier 1:  The [oil] industry, including ships, offshore installations and oil transfer facilities … 
are required to have an oil spill contingency plan and to carry out the initial response to a spill 
(s. 287).   
 
Tier 2:  The relevant regional or unitary council … are required to develop, approved by the 
MSA, oil spill contingency plans and respond to spills inside the territorial sea (s. 288 – 293, 
299, 300).      
 
Tier 3:  Maritime Safety Authority is responsible for developing a National Marine Oil Spill 
Contingency Plan.  This plan also provides an information base to be used in developing plans 
and maintaining an effective response capability at all levels (s. 296 – 298).  MSA also 
manage spills … outside the territorial sea and any spills that regional councils are unable to 
handle on their own (s. 296 – 298). 
 
Tier 4:  If the spill is beyond the resources of New Zealand, The MSA coordinates the 
international assistance (s. 301 – 304).  
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ability and/or effectiveness to take action.  Hence the MSA, who have national 
control and responsibility for oil spills in the marine environment, will often be 
‘called in’ to a Tier One or Two spill situation to advise or physically assist  
(equipment and/or personnel) with the clean-up.   
 
Lastly, the MSA is also endowed with the authority to prosecute the offender, of 
any Tier Three or Four oil spill, for any damage and costs incurred in the clean-
up.  While for Tier Two oil spills, the regional council has prosecutorial power.  
This authority, to both the regional council and MSA, is provided for by way of 
the CLC (s. 342 – 369). Supplementary to this, if the oil spill perpetrator is 
unidentifiable then the CLC and Fund Convention (if necessary) will provide 
restitution. The MEAs that have contributed to this portion of the Act include the 
London Convention, OPRC and the SPREP Convention (Randerson, 1997; MSA, 
1995).  The third division is the Emergency Maritime and Emergency Protection 
Rules (s. 37, 38, 391, 447, 449, 450).  Through these sections the Director of the 
MSA is authorized to apply emergency rules, effective for a maximum of 120 
days, to situations that may cause death or serious injury and/or damage the 
marine environment or property. 
 
Apart from these three main partitions of the Act, the Authority can impose fees 
and charges to the users of their services.  This can include a ‘marine safety 
charge’ and the Oil Pollution Levy (OPL) for ships operating in New Zealand 
waters and entering any port.  The marine safety charge funds such things as 
navigational aids and distress and safety radio services and is regulated under 
section 191 and 445 of the MTA (MSA, 1995).  The OPL funds the Oil Pollution 
Fund (OPF) which supports the marine ‘oil spill response team’ and equipment to 
respond to oil spills in the marine environment and is the internalization of the 
economic costs of pollution to the shipping industry (MNZ, 2006).      
 
4.3.2a Evaluation of MTA 
 
Overall the 1994 Maritime Transport Act is a reactive piece of legislation.  This 
conclusion was reached because most, if not all, of the’ Rules’ in the Act are 
based on the requirements of the international treaties, such as the London 
Convention, MARPOL 73/78 and the CLC, that New Zealand has ratified.  The 
 64
MTA was a combination of other statutes that consolidated most maritime 
activity, especially commercial shipping and marine pollution, (though not 
fisheries) into one concise act and it also recognises the purposes and principles of 
the RMA (s.6 (a)).  Having said this, it could be stated that many of the rules and 
procedures in the Act are proactive.  This is because New Zealand has sought to 
avoid a major oil spill, on the scale of the Exxon Valdez or the Torrey Canyon, 
and therefore a core function of the Act is to prevent oil spills of all sizes in the 
marine environment. 
 
4.3.3 Marine Reserves Act 1971 (MRA) 
 
The Department of Conservation (DOC or Department) administers several 
statutes, or parts thereof, that relate to the management and protection of the 
marine environment.  These include the Wildlife Act 1953, the Marine Mammals 
Protection Act 1978 and aspects of the coastal provisions of the RMA.  However, 
only one is directly related to this research topic, which is the Marine Reserves 
Act 1971 (MRA) as the major case study is within the boundary of a marine 
reserve.  The present MRA is 35 years old and its primary purpose was and still is 
the protection of marine areas for scientific study in our territorial waters.  By 
2002 however, the Conservation Minister argued that “[the Act] served New 
Zealand well in its day, but is not able to meet today’s marine protection needs” 
(DOC, 2002 1).  According to the Department, over the years community values 
have changed in regard to marine reserves from being ‘not in my backyard’ (due 
to the ‘no fishing’ rule) to one of “sheer delight of viewing unspoilt underwater 
worlds teeming with fish and plant life” (DOC, 2002 1).  Consequently after two 
years of consultation the Marine Reserves Bill was introduced to Parliament in 
2002.  Thus, if the Bill is passed into law, the amended Act will retain certain 
fundamental aspects of the original statute, for instance ‘no harm’ public access to 
the reserve, but also include new principles like the conserving of marine 
biodiversity.  Other amendments, to the Act, would include the acknowledgement 
of the Crown’s obligations to Maori when establishing and administering marine 
reserves and the creation of reserves in the EEZ, as currently they can only be 
established within the Territorial Sea (DOC, 2002; 2005c). 
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4.3.3a Evaluation of MRA 
 
From its instigation the MRA would be considered to be proactive legislation. 
This is because at the beginning when the marine areas were secured for scientific 
research it was so that ‘we’ could learn more about the marine environment if it 
was protected.  The outcome however, was the protection offered ecosystems 
within a marine reserve ensured that it significantly constrained potential 
economic use such as fishing.  This makes the establishment of marine reserves a 
source of conflict within a community.  Nevertheless as time moved on, the 
marine reserves become more than just areas of scientific study or areas that 
people could not fish anymore they became ‘sanctuaries’ for all manner of marine 
life that requires protection.  The marine reserves that are created therefore can be 
argued to be examples of “critical natural capital” as Turner et al. (1994 56) 
explain in Chapter Two.  Consequently the MRA needed to be upgraded to reflect 
this shift in society values and once amended would continue to be proactive 
legislation. 
 
4.3.4 Regional Council Responsibilities   
 
The functions of regional councils under the RMA are specified in s.30.  
Basically, with regards to the coastal zone, the council has the authority to 
manage and control the effects of activities on the coastal marine area (in 
conjunction with the Minister of Conservation).  To accomplish these functions, 
regional councils develop and enforce RCPs that adhere to s.64 of the RMA and 
they can not be inconsistent with the New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement 
(NZCPS) (MfE, 1999).  Regional councils under the Local Government Act 2002 
are responsible for navigation and safety (of vessels) in harbours.  Another 
function of the Councils’ concerns marine pollution, each regional council is 
required through the Resource Management (Marine Protection) Regulations 
1998 of the RMA to produce and implement a regional marine spill contingency 
plan for their Territorial Sea.  The plans need to meet the requirements set out in 
the Marine Protection Rule and are approved and reviewed by the MSA (MSA, 
1996).  As the MSA is also required to produce a National Marine Oil Spill 
Contingency Plan this demonstrates legislative integrated coastal management.  
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4.3.4a Evaluation of Regional Council Responsibilities  
 
It is not difficult to identify whether a regional council’s coastal plans are 
proactive because they are the next step down from the NZCPS that advocates the 
precautionary approach, the preservation of the natural character and mitigating 
adverse effects to the coast.  The 1994 amendment of the RMA s.15B, which 
prohibits discharge of harmful substances from ships and off-shore platforms, 
unless the regional council allows it through their plans or permits, further 
enhances the regional council’s ability to protect the marine environment.  
Another requirement under the RMA, through the guidance of the MSA, is that 
all regional councils must have an ‘Oil Spill Response Plan’ (OSRP).  These 
plans if activated are ‘reactionary’, but by developing and improving them, 
training personnel in oil spill response and upgrading and/or advancing the 
technology required to clean-up a spill, the OSRP could be considered a proactive 
process.   
 
4.4 Chapter Summary  
 
New Zealand, as a member of the global community, accepted that to achieve 
long-term environmental viability legal and institutional changes needed to occur.  
Consequently, New Zealand has signed and/or ratified many of the hard and soft-
law MEAs advanced by the United Nations and its agencies. Of the hard-law 
MEAs that affect our marine environment, the recommendations from all three 
UNCLOS treaties, the London Convention, OILPOL (and now MARPOL 73/78 
and OPRC) have had considerable inclusion into our domestic legislation and 
policies.  This can be seen through the statutes of the RMA, not only as implied 
principles such as the precautionary approach, but with specific referencing, such 
as MARPOL 73/78 under the Marine Protection Rules of the MTA. Further to 
this, the UN has internalized the cost of oil pollution back to the oil industry 
through the CLC and Fund Convention agreements which New Zealand signed.  
This internalization has been continued with the MSA levying the shipping 
industry to fund the Oil Pollution Fund. 
 
The soft-law MEAs have also influenced national policies, an example is the 
‘integrated management of coastal and marine areas’ suggested by the Brundtland 
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Report and accredited in Agenda 21.  As a first step to this ‘integration’ all 
regional coastal plans must be consistent with and give effect to the national 
coastal policy, the NZCPS.   
 
The national statutes and policies, pertinent to the marine environment and oil 
spills, were also analysed as to whether they were categorised as proactive or 
reactive.  Except for the MTA, though it contained elements such as the Marine 
Protection Rules that would be deemed proactive was viewed as a reactionary 
piece of legislation, all the others were generally proactive.  This suggests, 
especially over the last 15 years, that New Zealand is determined to, not only 
fulfil its international obligations, but to embrace the concepts of the 
Sustainability Imperative that will hopefully ensure a sustainable marine 
environment in the future. 
 
Finally, DOC, the MSA and the regional councils regulate the ‘use of’ and 
‘protect’ the CMA through the requirements of the RMA, Maritime Transport Act 
and other statues that are applicable to this research.  The MSA, in implementing 
the MTA, are the primary agency that governs most maritime shipping activity 
and marine pollution prevention and clean-up in New Zealand waters, but the role 
of the regional council is also very significant, particularly to achieve integration 
of the CMA.  
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Chapter Five: The Case Studies   
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine two case studies.  The context will be 
briefly outlined by describing how and what types of oil pollution can enter the 
marine environment.  Next the major case study of the oil spill at the Poor Knights 
Islands Marine Reserve will be explored including the clean-up, pursuant court 
case and the follow-up action taken.  Finally, a desk review of the oil spill, clean-
up and outcome of the Jody F Millennium incident will be considered.   
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Major (>700 tonnes) oil spills, due to their immediate and often devastating 
effects are very newsworthy.  As previously mentioned the 1967 oil spill from the 
Torrey Canyon was the first major tanker spill, but the one that possibly captured 
public attention the most was the Exxon Valdez incident in 1989.  Although this 
was a relatively small major oil spill (37,000 tonnes), in comparison to others 
(largest: 286,000 tonnes), it occurred along part of the Alaskan coastline which 
had previously been unspoilt.  This spill, caused by one small error, killed an 
estimated one million seabirds, 4000 sea otters, an unknown quantity of salmon 
and herrings, 500 seals and 20 whales.  It also blackened 2080 kms of coastline 
and ensured the economic decline of the coastal community of Cordova that relied 
heavily on fisheries and tourism (Stow, 2006; The New Zealand Herald, 2004).   
Far less newsworthy are the oil spillages that occur from routine operations and 
non-point8 sources, both of which contribute nearly 20 times the amount of oil 
pollution into the marine environment than the major oil spills per year.  To put 
this into perspective it means that out of the estimated 2.365 million tonnes of oil 
that enter the oceans on an annual basis only 121,000 tonnes are due to tanker 
accidents (Clark, 1997).  Nevertheless, it is the major oil spills that appear to have 
the most negative environmental, economic and social consequences.  There are 
three reasons for this; firstly, the wildlife deaths that can be directly attributed to 
large spills; secondly, there is little acknowledgement of non-point source input 
                                                 
8 A ‘non-point’ source is any additive that enters, in this case, the marine environment from 
diverse points of origin.  Examples include urban storm water run-off which usually contains 
amounts of oil and other chemicals washed from the roads and industrial sites or atmospheric fall-
out such as acid rain.  A ‘point’ source therefore, is a readily identifiable place of discharge such 
as a sewerage or radioactive waste outlet (Berry et al. 2005; Parker, 1997).       
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and operational oil spillages outside the industry and governmental agencies; and 
lastly the oceans have been the primary dumping ground for many of human-
kind's wastes for decades (Parker, 1997).  This reflects both the seeming infinite 
capacity of the oceans to cope with pollutants and its relative low cost for the 
polluter.  However, as David et al. (1997 328) note;  
 
Although the oceans can purify and recycle pollutants, their capacity 
to do so has limits.  The sheer volume of discharges can overload 
natural systems, and natural processes cannot readily degrade all the 
complex chemicals that have been created by modern industry.  
 
Accordingly much of the waste that is now present in the oceans of the world may 
not be assimilated at a rate able to match that of the pollution discharges into it.  
Despite the potential damage to individual flora and fauna, not all human wastes 
that are introduced to the marine environment cause ‘significant’ detrimental 
effects.  Sewerage is one that can be purified and recycled by the sea, though it 
depends on the amount of sewerage input and/or how often, and/or if there are 
high concentrations of other components such as metals, oils and grease in the 
organic matter (Clark, 1997).   
 
The oceans can also reprocess some types and quantities of oil.  Various types of 
oil react differently when in or on seawater.  For example 250,000 tonnes of oil 
yearly seep into the oceans from natural reservoirs.  This seepage, which has not 
been chemically altered by humans, is more easily assimilated into the oceanic 
habitats and organisms that surround the leak than chemically altered oil (Stow, 
2006).  The chemical characteristics of oil are defined by the proportion of hydro-
carbons to the other constituents like sulphur, vanadium and iron.  This variance 
of hydrocarbon to other elements often depends on the oil’s country of origin 
and/or whether the oil has been modified.  Additional determinants can include 
the oil’s viscosity, emulsibility, and volatility (MSA, 2005).  Thus, many grades 
of oil exist, but for the purposes of this research, the two general categories of 
persistent and non-persistent will be considered.  Persistent oils include crude oil, 
diesel fuel and refined products and as the name suggests the oil persists in the 
marine environment as they are not easily degraded.  Non-persistent oils are more 
easily dispersed within the water column or evaporated (Ross, 1973).  Therefore, 
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the outcome to an oil spill in the marine environment can be affected by several 
elements, such as the amount and type of oil, the weather conditions at the time 
and the nature and geography of the site (Clark, 1997).  Oil spills, of varying 
intensities, generate such harmful effects because most of them occur within the 
12 nm limit.  Not only does this generally mean that the oil will make landfall, 
thereby worsening the ecological damage and extending the clean-up efforts, but 
coastal waters are invariably inhabited by many sensitive aquatic organisms.  
Moreover, within the areas where there is mixing of fresh and salt water there is 
generally a higher production of nutrients.  Consequently, the territorial waters of 
maritime nations are commonly rich feeding grounds for a multitude of marine 
and bird species as well as being the nurseries of future fishing stock (Connell, 
1993; Doak, 2002).   
 
New Zealand is no exception to this rule.  Though not all of the approximately 
15,000 marine species that are currently found in our waters reside either 
specifically or continually within the 12nm limit, New Zealand does have a rich 
and diverse coastal seascape (DOC, 2005a).  Firstly, the majority of New 
Zealanders live and work near the coast.  Secondly, many of us enjoy a 
recreational and/or aesthetic relationship with the coastal area, and finally the 
CMA could be considered a crucial aspect of New Zealand’s trade and industry.  
The range of economic activity generated in the CMA comprises all manner of 
industries from shellfish harvesting to tourism and adventure sports, though 
possibly the most essential is maritime transport.  Being geographically isolated, 
we rely heavily on the shipping industry to compete in the world markets (MfE, 
2004).  By volume, 90% of New Zealand's exports and imports are transported by 
sea and on average 3,300 trading vessels visit New Zealand on an annual basis.  
Most sail via the eastern shipping lanes of the North Island en-route to and from 
the ports of Whangarei, Auckland, Tauranga or southwards (Kirkpatrick, 1999; 
Statistics New Zealand, 2003).  Additionally the Marsden Point Oil Refinery, 
New Zealand's only oil refinery, is located at the entrance to the Whangarei 
Harbour.  Of the four oil tanker classes9, the refinery can accept the Panama, 
Africa and Suez size tankers with approximately 350 Afrimax or Suez tankers 
                                                 
9 Tanker classes:  Panama  -  60,000  Dead Weight Tonnage (DWT) 
                             Africa     - 110,000 DWT 
                             Suez       - 150,000 DWT 
                             Super      - 500,000 DWT (Wetendorf, 2004) . 
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arriving per year (Wetendorf, 2004).  Further to these larger tankers, which carry 
crude oil, the refinery also receives between three to six product tankers per 
month.   These product tankers (25,000 tonne capacity) deliver either already 
refined oil products or oil that is between the crude and refined stage.    Finally, 
the refinery also loads the coastal tankers (25,000 tonne capacity) that deliver 
two-thirds of the refineries product to other New Zealand ports for distribution 
(Wetendorf, 2004).  Doak (2002 1) pointed out that “the risk of a major oil spill 
on the New Zealand coast has never been greater” especially from an oil tanker.  
Despite such expectations, the research on the literature shows that an oil spill is 
more likely to be from other types of commercial vessels than from tankers as 
was the case in the two oil spills that are detailed below.  
 
5.2 Case Study – Poor Knights Islands Marine Reserve  
 
In Chapter Three the rationale for a case study methodological approach was 
elucidated, as was the choice of the Poor Knights Islands Marine Reserve 
(PKIMR) oil spill as the major case study.  In presenting the results of the 
research I firstly provide a contextual background of the case study.  This consists 
of a summary of both the Maori and European habitation of the Islands and how 
the surrounding sea was designated as a marine reserve.  Then the oil spill, the 
identification and prosecution of the perpetrator and the internationally recognized 
precedence of a ‘shipping ban’ placed between the coast and the PKIMR are 
discussed. 
 
5.2.1 Maori History of the Poor Knights Islands   
 
One of Northland's key industries is tourism and arguably a ‘jewel in the crown’ is 
the Poor Knights Islands Marine Reserve.  These islands are the remnants of four 
million-year-old volcanoes and are situated 24 km north-east of Whangarei.  The 
group consists of two main islands (Tawhiti Rahi the northern and largest, 
Aorangi the southern island) and several smaller islets and rock outcrops (Doak, 
2004).  Both of the larger islands were inhabited by the Ngati Wai tribe or sub-
tribes for many generations until the early 19th-century (circa 1808).  Then the 
Hikutu, a tribe from the mainland, raided the islands for slaves and pigs.  They 
took some slaves, but killed most of the other inhabitants.  Chief Te Tatau of 
 72
Ngati Wai and his warriors, who had been away fighting elsewhere, returned to 
the islands  and upon discovering the massacre and enslavement of many of the 
tribe declared the islands as tapu (sacred) and left to resettle in the Bay of Islands 
(DOC, 2003).  
 
5.2.2. How the Poor Knight Islands became a Marine Reserve   
 
Since the departure of the Ngati Wai, the government assumed ownership and 
sold the islands to a private citizen.  Forty-three years later, mid-eighteen 
hundreds, the government brought or took the islands back, and they have been 
under the Crown’s control ever since.  First, the islands were a lighthouse reserve 
from 1883 to 1923, then they became a scenic reserve and by 1975 the islands 
were a fauna and flora reserve. Today they are identified as a nature reserve, 
under the Reserves Act 1977, with no landing access above the waterline.  In 
1981, the waters surrounding the islands (24 km2) were established as a marine 
reserve.   This was achieved with the full endorsement of the Ngati Wai people to 
help protect the significant tapu of the islands (DOC, 2003; Parata, 2004).  Marine 
reserves are effectively New Zealand’s oceanic national parks.  It is easy to see 
why the marine environment of the Poor Knights Islands was established as a 
marine reserve.  The uniqueness of the area comes from the lack of human impact 
for nearly a century (though the sheltered waters and abundant fish life made the 
area a popular fishing location, especially for recreational fishers), the proximity 
to the continental shelf and the influence of sub-tropical currents which have 
created habitats for a diverse abundance of sea creatures (Doak, 2002). These 
include sub-tropical and temperate species from sponges and nudibranchs to 
pelagic and reef fish (Plate One).  
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Plate One: An example of the marine species - Poor Knights Islands (Skipworth, 
2006). 
 
The proliferation of underwater caves, tunnels and archways, within water of 
exceptional clarity meant the PKIMR has become an internationally famous dive 
spot.  This was partly due to the endorsement of Jacques Cousteau, who rated the 
marine reserve as ‘one of the world’s top 10 dive areas’ (NZ Travelplanner, 
2004).  The other natural wonder is Rikoriko Cave the world’s largest sea cave, 
well-known for the live concerts held there, that also attract many non-diving 
tourists to the reserve (Doak, 2002; Media Resources, 2005).  While it was 
relatively easy to justify establishing a marine reserve in 1981, there was 
controversy in 1998, when a ban on recreational fishing at the reserve was secured 
to protect the fish life (Seafriends, 2006).  Nonetheless, even with the status as a 
marine reserve and the protection this entails, coastal and oceanic conservation 
areas cannot be fenced off and therefore they cannot be entirely shielded from all 
harmful human impacts (DOC, 2005b).  
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5.2.3 Oil Spill at the Poor Knights Islands   
 
The shipping traffic off the Northland coast is high and will probably only 
intensify.  The New Zealand Statistics Department’s yearbooks (1990; 2000) 
show that nationwide between the years of 1989 to 1999 the gross tonnes 
unloaded increased by over 5.5 million and the gross loaded tonnage virtually 
doubled to nearly 20 million tonnes.  A third of the approximately 80% of cargo 
loaded and unloaded at North Island seaports is handled by the ports of 
Whangarei and Auckland.  Over the same period, the import of crude oil increased 
by 40% (Statistics Department, 1990; 2000).  Because of this increase of vessel 
traffic, the MSA suggested a Voluntary Vessel Routeing Code (VVRC) in 1994 
for all oil tankers and hazard/bulk liquid carriers passing the Northland coast.  
These vessels were requested to sail five nautical miles off the coastline, thereby 
passing east of the Poor Knights Islands and High Peaks Rock (Figure Seven) 
(MSA, 2001).   
 
Figure Seven: Area avoided if VVRC is followed (MSA, 2001 17). 
 
Even though this routeing code was voluntary and only asked of the liquid bulk 
transporters, several other shipping companies followed the new guidelines 
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(Wetendorf, 2004).  Nevertheless, as it was permissible, a number of trading 
vessels continued to pass between the coast and the islands.  Hence, in the early 
afternoon of the 2nd of December 1999 when several commercial ships were 
navigating the channel one of them apparently emptied its bilge water into the sea.  
This discharge, of several tonnes of oil and other contaminants, caused an oil slick 
that quickly spread over a wide area (1.5km by 6km) in a north-easterly line that 
paralleled the shipping lane (NRC, 1999). 
 
The spill was reported to the Northland Regional Council at around 4 pm that day 
by a charter fishing vessel.  The Council immediately initiated their Oil Spill 
Contingency Plan (OSCP) including notifying the MSA National Oil Spill Centre.  
At the time of the PKIMR oil spill, the manager of the MSA National Oil Spill 
Centre was Mr Niblock10.  Accordingly, his duties were to “keep an eye on and 
assist the Regional Council with advice” (Niblock, 2004 1).  So, even though Mr 
Niblock was not in the ‘thick of things’ he was able to provide an overview of the 
oil spill and follow-up action.   Niblock (2004 1) stated that the first step (under 
the OSCP), was to “put aerial surveillance up … to assess the size of the spill and 
the weather conditions [which] were pushing it out towards the Poor Knights … 
[causing] a problem as they didn’t have a lot of time before it got there.  But [the 
plane] also identified a number of ships in the area, one of which proved later on 
to be the one that spilled the oil”.  The other immediate action taken was to collect 
samples of the oil slick for identification purposes (MSA, 1999).    
 
The spotter plane observed that the spill, due to the 10 knot south-westerly wind 
at the time, was moving directly towards the islands.  It was soon realised by the 
‘on-scene’ response team11 that little could be done before nightfall especially as 
the use of a dispersant, which is sometimes more harmful than the oil, was not an 
option with the slick heading towards the reserve.  The assessment was that most 
of the slick would just pass through the islands with minimal damage and this is 
what ensued.  By the following morning there were extensive patches of oil on 
either side of the islands, which with the aid of the south-westerly, drifted out past 
                                                 
10 In 2004, Mr Niblock was employed by the Northland Regional Council, as the manager of the 
Council’s Oil Spill Response Team and Whangarei Port Harbour Master.  Mr Niblock also, at that 
time, was the Maritime Safety Authority’s National On-Scene Commander for oil spills (Niblock, 
2004).      
11 ‘On-scene’ on the 2nd of December 1999, was the Regional Council’s ‘oil spill response’ 
personnel.   
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the 12nm limit and eventually dispersed.  Nevertheless, though the majority of the 
slick appeared to bypass the islands the remainder still had a destructive impact.  
Parts of the shoreline and many of the smaller sea caves and tunnels were soiled 
by the oil, but the two that were damaged the most ‘ecologically’ were Jan’s 
Tunnel and Rikoriko cave.  The reason for this was that the walls, especially of 
the cave, provide a habitat above and below the inter-tidal zone for many rare 
species of flora (MSA, 1999; Niblock, 2004). 
 
Due to the rareness of the plant life various strategies were used to collect the oil.  
Firstly, to recover as much of the still floating oil, buoyant absorbent booms and 
wildlife nets were used.  Then the walls were sprayed with low pressure sea water 
to remove oil back into the sea for collection.  Lastly, to minimize further damage 
to the flora and fauna on the rocks they were patted down with absorbent sponges.  
DOC staff also searched the islands for any affected wildlife and discovered 12 oil 
soaked dead seabirds (MSA, 1999; NRC, 1999).  Niblock (2004, 3) described the 
effect of the oil as “a pretty horrible sight [and that] it looked like chocolate 
mousse [as it was] oil from the bilge of a ship mixed with water and all sorts of 
other stuff” (Plate Two). 
 
 
 
Plate Two: Oil slick heading onto the Poor Knights Islands Marine Reserve (NRC, 1999).
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Plate Three: Cleaning-up the oil spill at the reserve on the Poor Knights Islands Marine 
Reserve (NRC, 1999). 
 
As the oil spill occurred in the CMA it was a Tier 2 spill; this means the overall 
organisation for the clean-up was the responsibility of the NRC, though there was 
considerable support from DOC, Ngati Wai and environmentally aware local 
people such as author and marine photographer Wade Doak.  The MSA (as the 
National Oil Spill Response agency) was also ‘called upon’ for advice and 
assistance with finding the oil spiller.  Niblock (2004 3) stated that “a number of 
interested parties [About 15, trained oil spill response personnel from NRC and 
DOC and volunteers such as Wade Doak] … met [in Rikoriko cave] and decided 
[in accordance with NRC’s Oil Spill Contingency Plan] exactly how far the clean-
up was going to go and once this was agreed upon, they then worked towards that 
and stopped when the standard was reached”.  The reason given by Niblock (2004 
4) for removing only a particular amount of the oil-chemical concoction was 
because; 
 78
We [MSA and NRC] have learnt our lessons about cleaning-up oil 
spills from our own experiences … and other places … an example is 
the Exxon Valdez  spill where they worked to remediate the oil spill 
and they actually sterilised beaches … [which] haven’t come back to 
their pre-spill state.   
 
Accordingly the clean-up, after several days, was considered to have been 
successful.  This was based on past experience that sometimes too much cleaning-
up can have a worse effect on the flora and fauna than leaving some oil traces.  
Thus, it was left to nature to finalise the process and return itself to pre-spill form.  
Also during this clean-up it was realised, from evidence on the walls of Rikoriko 
cave, that there had been previous un-notified oil spill events that the environment 
seemed to have assimilated, possibly due to the spills being smaller.  Although no 
specific monitoring on the long-term effects of the 1999 oil spill have been made 
by NRC or DOC, when either agency has been on the islands for other reasons, 
neither have observed any enduring effects (Niblock, 2004).   
 
Further to the clean-up, the NRC had the responsibility to identify and prosecute 
the offenders of the oil spill.  As a member of the SPREP, New Zealand has a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Australia.  This MoU is basically a 
reciprocal arrangement between the two countries’s that should either country 
require assistance with an oil spill and/or follow-on action, the other will give it.  
Consequently when New Zealand’s MSA shortened the suspect list of vessels that 
may have caused the spill, and the next port of call for one of the vessels was 
Sydney, the Australian MSA was asked to assist. With the help of the Australian 
MSA the vessel was duly identified as the merchant vessel (MV) Rotoma.  This 
was determined using the following investigative techniques (Box Thirteen). 
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The MV Rotoma was travelling from Tauranga en-route to Sydney and went 
through the channel, as they were known to do regularly (New Zealand Customs, 
1999).  The ship is a roll-on roll-off container carrier that between 1 pm and 2.30 
pm on the 2nd  of December 1999 pumped overboard, through the oil-water 
separator, 5m3 of bilge water (contaminated with heavy fuel oil (HFO), light oil 
and other chemicals) and 2m3 of purifier slop (PS) tank contents.  The oil-water 
separator only works if the oil can float to the top of the water column and in this 
case it had not done so, as a result the discharged bilge water significantly 
exceeded the oil to water ratio of 15 parts per million (ppm) as required under 
MARPOL 73/78 (AMSA, 1999).   This and the following dumped contents of the 
PS tank, which contained detergent and other chemicals, ensured that the slick 
was of the ‘persistent’ variety.  Upon the confirmation of the offender the NRC 
then initiated prosecution proceedings. 
 
5.2.4 Prosecution Proceedings   
 
The next stage towards prosecution was to interview the Master, crew and owners 
of the vessel.  Consequently a meeting was held on the MV Rotoma on the 19th of 
December 1999, upon her return to Auckland.  Present were representatives of the 
MSA and NRC and agents for the Australia Direct New Zealand Direct Line 
(ANZDL) the owner, and Anglo Eastern Ship Management Ltd the operator.  
Also in attendance were the Master (Captain) and Chief and Duty Engineers of 
Box Thirteen      Investigation tools employed to identify the Oil spiller 
• Identification of the vessels in the region from the aerial photographs taken on the 2nd 
December 1999; 
• Data obtained from all North Island ports regarding the arrival and departure times of 
commercial vessels for the 1st and 2nd December; 
• The New Zealand Customs Vessel – Hawk IV, while executing routine surveillance 
around the PKIMR, tracked and spoke to the MV Rotoma at about the time the oil 
spill occurred; 
• A chemical match of the oil slick samples and samples obtained from the MV 
Rotoma’s engine room, upon her arrival in Australia; and 
•  Information from the MV Rotoma’s engine room and oil transfer log books 
(Australian    MSA (AMSA), 1999; MSA, 1999).  
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the vessel.  At the end of the meeting and with the finalization of the investigation 
the MSA reached the subsequent conclusions (Box Fourteen): 
 
 
Despite the fact that the MV Rotoma’s records showed that the bilge water and 
the PS tank were pumped out during their passage past the PKIMR and other 
evidence of culpability were advanced to the Captain, he still “denied the 
pollution allegations”(MSA, 1999 2).  The possible reason for this is that both the 
Chief and Duty Engineer were adamant that the bilge water and tank contents 
were and could only be emptied to the sea via the oil-water separator.  This was 
confirmed by the Maritime Safety Inspector who noted that all other avenues for 
waste water disposal were blocked off.  Therefore, as the oil-water separator was 
apparently working at the time the most probable explanation is that the oil (HFO 
and light) had not floated to the top of the waste storage tanks.  As a result, with 
the oil still suspended within the waste water column the oil-water separator could 
not do its job and the oil was discharged into the sea.  Upon completion of the 
enquiry by the MSA and NRC, the owners of the MV Rotoma were advised of the 
results and accepted liability for the oil spill (MSA, 1999).  Accordingly the court 
case became a sentencing hearing.  This was held in the District Court at 
Box Fourteen  Conclusions of Investigation of Oil spiller 
• The vessel had a leaking stern gland [where the propeller goes through the hull 
of the ship].  Seawater was leaking into the engine room at the rate of 
approximately 7.4 m3 per hour. 
• With such a constant leak into the engine room the bilge water, after being 
contaminated with oil and other chemical waste, was then pumped out into the 
sea through the oil-water separator every three hours. This practice had 
become routine. 
• There were standing orders in place regarding the management of engine room 
oily waste, but staff showed a marked lack of knowledge of these standing 
orders and no staff had signed them confirming that they had read them.   
• The bridge was not informed of the bilge water discharge, as per standing 
orders, and did not put a lookout at the stern. 
• During the last three months whilst the ship was inside the 12nm limit the 
vessel had pumped bilge water overboard a total of eight times. 
• The vessel, after one more trans-Tasman voyage, will be dry-docked for a 
major overhaul and as the ship has enough storage space to hold waste water 
between ports the ship will not be detained on environmental grounds (MSA, 
1999 6). 
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Whangarei on the 28th June 2000 with Judge R. Gordon Whiting presiding (Box 
Fifteen).  
 
Box Fifteen    Synopsis of Environment Court Hearing 
 
 
Between: Northland Regional Council (NRC) Informants 
and          Australia New Zealand Direct Line (ANZDL) First Defendant 
and          Anglo Eastern Ship Management  Second Defendant   
 
Charge: The defendants were jointly charged under s.338(1)(a) of the RMA 
 (discharging petroleum from a ship in the coastal marine area). 
The defendants were jointly charged under s.238 (s.227) of the MTA  
(neglected to notify the NRC or MSA  of the discharge).  
 
Penalty:  The first charge carry’s a maximum penalty of $200,000 fine, for a corporate body. 
 The second charge carry’s a maximum penalty of $100,000 fine, for a corporate 
body. 
 
 
The abridged comments by Judge Whiting, on the four issues, follow.    
 
Clean-up Costs:   
 
Mr Bell presented the cost of the clean-up, of the oil spill at the PKIMR, at $159,067.00.  
Judge Whiting ruled the costs as “actual and reasonable” and ordered the defendants to each 
pay half.  
 
Consideration of the Environment:   
The environmental concerns as they pertain to the fine were discussed next.  It included an 
outline of the PKIMR as an unusual and unique area of land and marine environments that 
provides a habitat for many rare and indigenous species.  In addition several types of dolphins, 
whales and seals inhabit the waters between the coast and the reserve and lastly that the Poor 
Knights Islands are of enormous spiritual and cultural importance to Ngatiwai.  The 
defendants argued that although the area is environmentally unique and it is thrice protected 
under the RMA, the area has not been stipulated as ‘special’ under the MARPOL Convention.  
Within the MARPOL Convention rulings there are internationally specified areas of the 
marine environment where ships are forbidden to discharge bilges, no matter what type or 
through any method, and the PKIMR does not have that protection under the Convention.  
Judge Whiting accepted this reasoning and assured the defendants that he would “balance it 
against the importance of the Poor Knights from an ecological … and from a Maori and 
traditional point of view”.   
Level of Responsibility and Prompt Guilty Pleas: 
The final two issues were the ‘intentionality of the offences’ and the ‘prompt recognition of 
responsibility’ by the defendants.  The defendants clarified the cause to the Court which 
essentially was due to surfactants (binds oil to water molecules) contaminating the bilge water 
and the oil-water separator malfunctioned, unbeknownst to the crew.  The Bridge was not 
notified of the discharge, as they should have been, and as a result no-one visually sighted the 
discharge, thus no-one realised so much oil was being expelled.  Judge Whiting acknowledged 
that the act was not deliberate, but it was a case of negligence as the relevant crew acted 
carelessly and outside of the standing orders.  Finally, the Judge recognized that the defendants 
“are responsible corporations … [with] no previous convictions of any kind [and therefore] 
they are entitled to the credit they have built up in the bank of good corporate citizenship”.  
This recognition and the early guilty pleas, avoided a lengthy trial, and were taken into account 
prior to sentencing.  
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It was reported by Gregory (2000 1) that “the fines match the New Zealand record 
under the Resource Management Act for offences relating to the illegal discharge 
of contaminants”.   
 
5.2.5 ‘No Go’ Area for the PKIMR   
 
While it’s hard to envisage any positive outcomes from an oil spill, there has been 
one from the 1999 PKIMR spill.  Firstly, because of this spill, other previously 
un-known oil spills at the islands were identified.  Niblock (2004 1) thought that it 
was “possibly ships [empty their] … bilges at night and the oil had broken down 
by the morning … but you could still see the evidence on the rocks”.  These older 
spills were later confirmed by a marine biologist from Auckland University 
(Gregory, 2000b).  Hence, all the oil spills highlighted the vulnerability of the 
reserve.  This in conjunction with the various ‘near misses’ that have occurred 
over the years propelled the NRC, DOC and MSA to apply to the IMO for a ban 
on all large ships passing between the coast and the islands (Niblock, 2004).  New 
Zealand, as a member of the IMO and a signatory to other international maritime 
agreements needed the IMO’s authorization12 for any obligatory restrictions. 
Further to the government agencies, Ngati Wai Iwi and other interested parties 
                                                 
12A ‘mandatory requirement’ for any maritime legislation to be applicable to all vessels it must be 
approved by an international maritime body, in this case the IMO.  Therefore, if a country only 
recognizes a maritime requirement within their domestic statutes, it would apply to that country’s 
flagships alone, even in their own waters (MSA, 2001). 
Box Fifteen (cont.)     
   
Sentence:  
 
Initially the Judge stated that collectively the offences necessitated a $90,000 fine, to be 
equally divided between the defendants.  Due to the prompt guilty pleas, this penalty would be 
reduced by $30,000.  The sentencing is that both ANZDL and Anglo Eastern Ship 
Management Ltd were fined as follows:   
• Discharging a contaminant - $25,000 each; and 
• Failing to notify relevant authorities of the pollution - $ 5,000 each; and  
• The Clean-up Costs of $79,533.50 each; and 
• Court costs ($130.00 each) and the prosecutions costs (when finalised)     
(Northland Regional Council v Australia New Zealand Direct Line Ltd and 
Anglo Eastern Ship Management CRN 9088018862, 64, 66-7, 28/06/00). 
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like the Forest & Bird Society and local personalities also encouraged the ban.  As 
Doak (2002 1) stated “[our] aim should be disaster prevention, with the most 
rigorous and stringent of safety measures” as “the prospect of black tides 
smothering our coastlines” with all that that entails is under “human control”.  
 
Subsequently, both the MSA and DOC raised with their Ministers, the proposed 
compulsory ‘no-go’ zone be put in place.  The Ministers agreed and so the process 
began.  The first stage was to review the 1994 VVRC.  As Wetendorf (Ship 
Inspector – MSA, Whangarei) (2004 5) noted the voluntary closure was observed 
“98% of the time”.  He also pointed out that “two of the major oil companies who 
were chartering the tankers … [were themselves] instructing the Masters to stay 
east [of the islands] … (Wetendorf, 2004 5).  Niblock (2004 1-2) also agreed with 
Wetendorf when he stated that;  
 
[J]ust because it is full of oil doesn't mean that a tanker poses the 
greatest risk for a spill or that other vessels might not have a lot of oil 
on board when they sail from here … [for example the] MV Rotoma 
wasn’t an oil tanker, despite the fact that she made a lot of mess.  It 
was recommended that … [tankers and bulk liquid carriers] went 
outside the Poor Knights, but if they were running late with the tide or 
whatever … [they could still come down] between the coast and the 
islands … we [checked] and found that most of them did [sail east of 
the islands] … still the odd one [didn’t because they] either didn't see 
the notice, didn’t understand what laden was … because for a lot of 
people at sea … English is their second language … or they just 
ignored the notice.   
    
The 1994 review of the VVRC was to ascertain the following (MSA, 2001 2); 
 
1.  Whether to extend the Code to include other types of vessels; and 
2.  Whether all or parts of the Code should become mandatory 
 
To answer these questions the MSA (2001 2) used “a risk based approach to 
determine those areas of the coastline that may need to be considered for a greater 
degree of protection …”.  Consequently,  parts  of  the coastline were assessed for  
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the risk the area was in from pollution, caused by a vessel, and the sensitivity13 of 
the environment to that pollution.  Upon completion of the review the 
recommendations included “voluntary measures for domestic application and 
mandatory requirements to be submitted to the International Maritime 
Organisation” (MSA, 2001 2). 
 
The MSA then recommended to the IMO that a ‘mandatory area to be avoided’ 
(MATBA) should be established along Northland’s east coast (Niblock, 2004).  
New Zealand’s application for this MATBA was duly heard by the IMO Sub-
committee on Safety of Navigation in January 2003 (IMO, 2003).  The 
submission identified the proposed MATBA to consist of that part of the North-
eastern coast of the North Island from Bream Head to Cape Brett and extending 
east of the PKIMR.  The justification for the MATBA were many and took 
account of the ecology of the coastline and coastal waters [between Bream Head 
and Cape Brett], the diversity of the PKIMR and the cultural, scientific and 
economic significance of the area.  New Zealand further submitted that apart from 
three exemptions14 the MATBA applies to all vessels larger than 45m in length.  
In connection with this request New Zealand provided a summary of the 
MATBA’s impact on shipping.  Effectively, the only disadvantages were the cost 
of the slight increase of mileage, being 10.1nm for vessels to/from Marsden Point 
and Whangarei and 2.5nm for ships heading north from Auckland and the Hauraki 
Gulf, and the extra time this took. 
 
The Sub-committee was also informed that the MATBA had been “generally 
supported … and a number of international tanker operators specifically supported 
this measure” (IMO, 2003 9).  After the submission had passed through several 
committee hearings, the IMO granted the application.  Consequently in May 2004, 
                                                 
13 [The criterion for] designating a “particularly sensitive sea area” (PSSA) [under the IMO]… 
include ecological criteria; such as unique or rare ecosystem, diversity of the ecosystem or 
vulnerability to degradation by natural events or human activities; social, cultural and economic 
criteria, such as significance of the area for recreation or tourism; and scientific and educational 
criteria, such as biological research or historical value (IMO, 2006a 1). 
14 The exemptions are the New Zealand Royal Navy (NZRN), commercial fishing vessels and 
barges towing stricken vessels.  A possible justification for these exemptions maybe; as the NZRN 
defends New Zealand’s waters they should have excess to the waters; New Zealand does not have 
a totally integrated coastal management system, as Fisheries are often exempted from other coastal 
management structures and as barges towing stricken vessels are a matter of safety for either or 
both the crew and vessel under tow and/or less hazardous for the environment.  Finally, Marshall 
(2006, (per. com.)) stated that the RNZN and most commercial fishing vessels are fuelled by 
diesel, which is a non-persistent oil and usually evaporates before too much damage is done.         
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16 months after the MSA had submitted the application to the IMO and nearly 
four and half years after the PKIMR oil spill, New Zealand had its MATBA.  Part 
of the media coverage, of the MATBA announcement, included an interview with 
Russell Kilvington the Director of Maritime Safety who acknowledged that; 
 
It means we have succeeded where no-one else has succeeded in the 
past.  We've got a mandatory area to be avoided.  We’ve managed to 
convince the world, with all its penchant for freedom of the seas ... 
that environment sometimes has to take precedence over economics 
(TV3, 2004).    
 
The IMO (2006b, 1) confirm Mr Kilvington’s statement, in that under MARPOL 
73/78:  
Annex I - Prevention of pollution by oil … defines certain sea areas as 
“special areas” in which, for technical reasons relating to their 
oceanographical and ecological condition and to their sea traffic, the 
adoption of special mandatory methods for the prevention of sea 
pollution is required (emphasis in original).  
 
Although there are already other areas in the world that are classified as 
‘special areas’, due to either their location (i.e. busy trading routes) or other 
factors their mandatory protection is in the form of ‘Traffic Separation 
Schemes’ or ‘Mandatory Ship Reporting Systems’ (IMO, 2006c).  
Therefore, New Zealand has achieved a world first with this MATBA and 
the restricted area is illustrated below (Figure Eight). 
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Figure Eight: Northland’s Mandatory Area to be Avoided (Adapted by Oulton, 2006).  
 
The MATBA however, did not come into effect until the 1st of December 2004.  
Niblock (2004 3) mentioned that the six-month ‘grace period’ is “to allow time 
for the charts ... to be corrected ... the sailing directions … to be changed and … 
the message to get out to the international maritime community”.  He also stated 
“that since the announcement [of the MATBA] the NRC had received a number 
of reports to their Environmental Hotline saying the ships are travelling inside the 
‘no-go area’ and we have had to tell them that they are still allowed to do that … 
until the 1st  December” (Niblock, 2004 2).    With these calls to the Hotline and 
the nature of the responses from people I either interviewed or met socially while 
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I was completing my fieldwork it appears the community of Whangarei welcome 
the MATBA.  
 
Other parts of the coastline were assessed regarding their risk to and from marine 
pollution by the MSA.  This was in the belief that these coastal areas might also 
meet the IMO's criteria for PSSA, but they didn't either due to not having enough 
sea traffic or not being sufficiently ecologically diverse or vulnerable (MSA, 
2004).  Consequently for these coastal communities, though the probability of 
spill is not as high as Northland’s east coast or the environment as unique, there is 
still a risk and for the township of Gisborne it became a reality as revealed in the 
next case study.   
 
5.3 Desk-top Case Study - Jody F. Millennium   
 
The PKIMR and Jody F Millennium (JFM) events have some similarities in that 
they both resulted in oil spills in the marine environment which caused some 
ecological damage, but the responsibility for and the cause of the spills are very 
different.  Two variants, that are non-chronological, ought to be noted as they may 
have contributed to the outcome of the ‘accident’.  The foremost is the vessel.  In 
the PKIMR case the MV Rotoma, registered in New Zealand, was over 20 years 
old and had equipment and structural wear and tear, which was the main reason 
why the crew needed to regularly empty the bilges (MSA, 1999).  In contrast the 
JFM, registered in Panama, was practically brand new as it had been 
commissioned for launch in 2000 (MSA, 2003).  The second is the nationality of 
the crew.  The MV Rotoma’s crew, from the Captain down, were New Zealanders 
fluent in English though this had no bearing on the actual spill (MSA, 1999).  
While of the 19 officers and crew aboard the JFM; two were Korean nationals, 
being the Master and Chief Engineer, while the rest were Filipino nationals.  The 
JFM is a bulk carrier that routinely carried logs that could be carried above and 
below the deck (MSA, 2003).  To simplify matters the review will be in 
chronological order (Box Sixteen), beginning with the JFM arriving in 
Wellington. 
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Box Sixteen       Chronology of Jody F Millennium Oil Spill 
 
Day One:  1st February 2002 - The JFM arrived at Wellington and loaded 4,690 tonnes of 
logs (less than a fifth of her DWT).   
Day Two: 2nd February 2002 - The vessel departed Wellington at 1000 hours on route to 
Gisborne with an estimated time of arrival at Gisborne as 1000 hours the following day. 
Day Three: 3rd of February 2002 - The vessel arrived offshore of Gisborne at 0900 hours but 
wasn’t piloted into the harbour until 2150 hours that night.  The reason given for this over 12 
hour wait is that either they were waiting for a berth or the high tide (MSA, 2003; Marshall, 
2006 (per. com.)). 
Day Four and Five:  4th and 5th February 2002 - The JFM was loaded with logs during these 
two days. 
Day Six:  6th February 2002 – Loading continued throughout the day, but by late afternoon 
the weather, in the harbour, had deteriorated to such a point that it was unsafe for the 
stevedores to continue.   The JFM usually carries a total of 24,234 tonnes, but the vessel had 
approximately 22,000 tonnes of logs on board, of which a portion stowed on the deck was un-
secured as the crew could not secure it under the weather conditions at the time.   In the 
evening the weather conditions continued to deteriorate, and were considered at the time to be 
‘extraordinarily severe’.  The sea surges caused both vertical and horizontal movement of the 
ship against the berth, to the extent that the five ship-to-shore lines broke.  To lessen the 
vessels movement against the quayside, the two harbour tugs were employed to continually 
push the JFM alongside the dock.  This worked for a short while and then one of the tugs was 
damaged and they were advised to move away.  With the surges inside the harbour still 
increasing the JFM was advised, by the Port Authority, for safety reasons to leave and anchor 
offshore.  
Aside 1:  Prior to departure of any vessel, it’s under keel clearance (UKC) must be measured 
against the latest harbour channel survey. The Harbour Pilot calculated the JFM’s UKC as 1.5 
metres, .5 of a metre under the Pilot’s minimum of 2 metres.  A minimum UKC of 10 per cent 
is recommended as safe practice only if speed is … kept under five knots … [and] … the wind 
will not greatly affect the steering at low speed MSA (2003, 12) .          
Aside 2: The ‘rules of command’ on a vessel are that the Master has overall control of the 
ship, but that advice from the Pilot is generally accepted.  This custom was upheld in this 
instance, especially as the Captain had informed the Pilot that he had no previous experience 
of Gisborne Harbour. 
Day Six cont.: The vessel departed the quayside at 2138 hours. At the time of departure “the 
wind was southerly at about 20 knots and … there was a heavy southerly swell off the entrance 
to the harbour” (MSA, 2003 14).  At 2150 hours the Pilot left the vessel with, as far as the 
Pilot is concerned, the corroboration of the Captain.  The Captain denies this and states that 
“… he was not happy for the Pilot to disembark early but nevertheless accepted the ‘con’ 
(conduct of the vessel) without challenge” (MSA, 2003 16). The wind now at 30 knots and a 5 
to 7 metre swell, the vessel was pitching violently.  At 2152 hours the ship was hit by a wave 
that caused it to roll starboard and when it rolled back it touched the sea floor.  With the loss of 
UKC the vessel struck the seafloor several times and this damaged her steering mechanisms.  
The result from this was that at 2158 hours the JFM had run aground outside of the entrance to 
Gisborne harbour.  The initial action taken was to use the engines to move the vessel off the 
sea floor, this was ineffective.  Then the Pilot, via radio, instructed the Captain to drop the 
anchors, to hopefully stabilize the vessel and ensure it didn’t embed itself further.  This action 
was also unsuccessful as the anchor cables broke and the anchors were lost.  Both tugs were at 
hand, but due to the now seven to eight metre high waves, they couldn’t get near the ship to 
render assistance and were eventually stood down.  By 2300 hours the Director of Maritime 
Safety was notified of the grounding (Lee-Richards et al, 2002; MSA, 2003). 
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The MSA Accident Report (2003) concluded that the direct cause of the accident 
was the ‘severity of the storm’ that not only ensured the vessel was not safe within 
the harbour, but also offshore.  Though the vessel did not have the optimum 
recommended UKC for the channel, it was thought that it was a viable option as 
the vessel would be in less danger in open waters.  Therefore, the attempt was 
Box Sixteen (cont.) 
 
Day Seven:  7th February 2002 – At 0400 hours, the MSA declared a Tier 3 oil spill 
response.  This was in advance of any knowledge that an oil spill had occurred, as the 
legislation permits the declaration of an oil spill even if a ‘probable release’ situation exists 
(Lee-Richards et al, 2002).  The JFM carried 700 tonnes of fuel, which consisted of 625 tonnes 
of HFO and 75 tonnes of diesel.  The severe weather and sea conditions continued throughout 
the day and into the night. Though the JFM was still grounded, it appeared to be holding up 
and there was no evidence of any oil leakages.  This allowed the MSA Oil Spill Response 
(OSR) Team over 36 hours to organize a spill response, should it occur (Lee-Richards et al, 
2002; MSA, 2003). 
Day Eight: 8th February 2002 - At 1220 hours the OSR Team received the call that the vessel 
was leaking HFO from the hull.  The leak was seeping from the Number Three fuel tank due to 
three tears in the shell plating.  Overall it was estimated that 25 to 30 tonnes of HFO was spilt.  
In a bid to prevent leakage from the vessel’s other two bottom HFO tanks about 2/3rds of the 
oil, from these tanks, was pumped into the vessel’s upper ‘below deck’ ballast tanks.  
Additionally 200 odd tonnes of HFO was also transferred to barges which then off loaded 
about half to HMNZS Endeavour.  This left about 415 tonnes still on the vessel, though not in 
the bottom of the hull (MSA, 2003). 
Clean-up:  Due to the day and a half of ‘grace’ between the declaration of the Tier Three oil 
spill and the actual spill the effectiveness of the clean-up was greater and it also lessened the 
environmental damage.  Booms had been assembled and were quickly deployed to protect 
what the OSR Team thought were the more environmentally sensitive areas like the Taruheru 
and Turanganui River mouths.  For the larger areas, because of the amount of oil and incoming 
flood tide, little could be done to stop the oil impacting on the beach.  In a bid to prevent 
leakage from the vessel’s other two bottom HFO tanks about 2/3rds of the oil, from these 
tanks, was pumped into the vessel’s upper ‘below deck’ ballast tanks.  Additionally 200 odd 
tonnes of HFO was also transferred to barges which then off loaded about half to HMNZS 
Endeavour.  This left about 415 tonnes still on the vessel, though not in the bottom of the hull 
(MSA, 2003).  The process of clearing the oil also began that afternoon.  Initially a trial-run 
was conducted of spraying a dispersant on the oil still afloat in the bay.  This appeared to be 
effective on the Friday and so was continued throughout Saturday, but by Sunday morning it 
was apparent that the dispersant didn’t work nearly as well as initially believed and it was 
discontinued.   Other methods included a skimming operation that used vacuum trucks and 
later people shovelling the oil soaked sand into front-end loaders for removal. Though some 
areas did receive a moderate amount of damage, such as at the entrance to Turanganui River 
due to a boom failure at 3am Saturday morning, overall the OSR Team felt that minimal harm 
was done to the environment.  This was mainly due to the number of people (120, both trained 
staff of MSA and Council, but mostly volunteers) involved in the operation and the 36 hours 
of preparation time.  The clean-up was effectively concluded by Tuesday the 12th February, 
but as the JFM was still aground and another storm was forecast for Thursday the 14th 
February the OSR Team was not stood down.  Though the storm did eventuate, and was as 
severe as the previous Wednesday, there was no further oil spillage from the vessel.  Due to 
both the likelihood of further oil leaks having been greatly reduced and the monetary criteria, 
only ten OSR Team members remained on stand-by at Gisborne until the vessel was re-floated 
on Sunday the 24th of February (Lee-Richards et al, 2002).     
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made to sail it out of the harbour.  The MSA’s report while accepting that the 
cause of the accident was basically the weather still severely censures the parties 
involved including the Pilot, the Port Authority and the Master of the ship.  The 
reprimands related to the ‘domino effect’ of the decisions made (i.e. one wrong 
decision and the following decisions will also be wrong), the lack of information 
and staffing levels at the Port. 
 
Price (2006, (per. com.)) suggests that there was plenty of disinformation and 
insufficient data leading up to the Pilot’s decision to order the JFMillennium out 
of the harbour.  For instance, the Pilot was informed that not only had all the 
moorings to the ship broken, but that there were no more moorings.  This was 
untrue.  Another reprimand, to the Port Authority, concerned the deficiency of the 
bathymetric survey, which if not regularly updated will alter the competency of 
the UKC calculation.  These and the various other reprimands, along with the 
MSA’s recommendations for the management of the port and harbour and/or 
channel modifications are explored further in the analysis chapter.  Furthermore, a 
former Gisborne Port Harbour Master, Captain Ian Cook, rejects the findings of 
the MSA Accident Report.  Captain Cook believes that “the decision to send the 
vessel out of port when it could not avoid hitting the sea bed, sent the Jody F 
Millennium to certain disaster, jeopardising the lives of 19 men … and causing 
$23 million worth of damage” (Lloyds, 2003 1).  Though Captain Cook does not 
specify what he considers the cause of the incident others, such as the owners of 
the vessel, lay the blame squarely on the Port Authority and its owners the 
Gisborne District Council (Lloyds, 2003).  These differences and the possible 
rationale for them will be discussed further in Chapter Six.  
 
5.4 Chapter Summary  
 
In summary New Zealand has been fortunate that, of the spills that have occurred 
here, none have been from a laden oil tanker.  The two spills at the PKIMR and 
off the Gisborne coast were a “minor” spill (Tier Two) and a “very small 
medium” (Tier Three) oil spill, respectively, caused by commercial vessels.  This 
obviously does not mean that there was no ecological harm done, but the damage 
appears, at present, to have had no long-term effects at either site.  The spill at the 
PKIMR, eventually had a beneficial outcome for the marine reserve and 
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Northland’s north-eastern CMA with the internationally recognised MATBA, for 
the larger ships, having been granted by the IMO.  With most of the commercial 
vessels (excluding fishing trawlers) now having to sail east of the reserve it 
ensures the maximum amount of protection from oil spills, that at present, can be 
given to this unique marine area.  The recommendations from the MSA Accident 
Report (2003) after the oil spill at Gisborne are not as easily substantiated.  
Firstly, a follow-up report conducted by the MSA about a year later is unavailable 
for this research and the owners of the Port of Gisborne, at the time of the spill, 
sold the business within a year of the accident.       
 
The PKIMR oil spill was a case of negligence, though at the root of the problem 
was the deterioration of the vessel’s hull and subsequent water leakage.  In 
contrast, the JFM was two years old when it ran aground, hence it was structurally 
sound and consequently able to withstand the battering it received for a longer 
time than an older ship could possibly have done.  This allowed a ‘relatively’ long 
time for the MSA to assemble equipment and personnel, from around the country, 
to lessen the harmful effects of the spill.  Although this was a good thing there is 
conflict among the various parties involved with this incident as to whether had 
other decisions been made on the 6th of February the grounding and subsequent 
spill might not have happened.   Accordingly, it could be said that both spills, 
while there were mitigating factors, primarily were due to human error.  As such 
the analysis chapter will explore this inference and the extenuating aspects of the 
cases within the boundaries of New Zealand’s maritime legislation.                     
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Chapter Six: Research Findings   
 
The focus of this chapter is to analyse the major issues that have emerged from 
the research.  The impacts of the theoretical perspectives outlined in Chapter Two 
are considered and the legislative influences and authority that govern the 
management of the coastal marine area are examined through the information 
collected from the case studies.  Finally, this chapter speaks to the question of 
integrated coastal management. 
 
6.1 Influence of MEAs   
 
Chapter Four examined both the hard and soft-law MEAs, specific to oil spill 
prevention in the marine environment, which New Zealand has ratified or signed 
and the chronology shows that nationally New Zealand has been very responsive 
to its international obligations.  This is demonstrated by the fact that New Zealand 
ratified OILPOL in 1971 and implemented the requirements of this MEA through 
the Marine Pollution Act in 1974.  New Zealand then accepted the London 
Convention in 1975.  This Convention incorporated the precautionary principle 
that ‘all dumping at sea is to be terminated, unless the waste had proven to be 
harmless’.  Again this Convention was initially acknowledged via amendment to 
the Marine Pollution Act 1974, under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Transport 
and administered by the MSA.  With the enactment of the RMA however the 
authorization for dumping waste within the limits of the territorial sea, became a 
regional council responsibility.  A further requirement to the London Convention 
was that member states also ratified SPREP which New Zealand did in 1990. 
 
The last explicit ‘marine pollution’ MEA that New Zealand accepted, in part, was 
MARPOL 73/78 in 1998.  Although it appears New Zealand did not commit to 
MARPOL 73/78 for two decades, it had adopted many of the obligations of the 
Protocol under the Maritime Transport Act 1994 and its predecessor the Marine 
Pollutions Act 1974.  Therefore, it can be seen from the timeline that these and 
other international agreements such as UNCLOS I, II and III, have influenced 
New Zealand’s legislation and in many respects, since the early seventies, we 
have been and are proactive in protecting the CMA from oil spills.  The degree of 
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connection with global MEAs is highlighted by the reality that New Zealand had 
to apply to the IMO to have the ‘mandatory area to be avoided’ incorporated in 
international shipping regulations. 
 
6.2 Analysis of Case Studies   
 
Although the two case studies examined were quite different in nature and 
biophysical context, they have provided useful insights into New Zealand’s 
response to oil spills within the coastal marine area.   
 
6.2.1 PKIMR and the MATBA  
 
New Zealand did not apply for the ‘mandatory area to be avoided’ (MATBA) 
between the coast and the Poor Knights Islands Marine Reserve only on the basis 
of the one oil spill at the reserve in December 1999.  The case study confirmed 
that it was an accumulation of unrealized minor oil spills that had drawn attention 
to the risk that the PKIMR was in from the passage of ships between the coastline 
and the islands.  This continual threat of oil spills to the marine reserve, led the 
movement to have an ‘internationally recognized’ ban of all ships through the 
channel.  The reason to have all ships banned was that, due to the initiation of the 
Voluntary Vessel Routeing Code five years previously, less than two percent of 
the oil tankers and hazardous bulk liquid carriers still sailed through the channel.  
Thus, the oil spills were from other commercial vessels. 
 
The IMO granted the application, though the oil spills were just part of their 
reasoning for doing so.  The IMO also regarded the PKIMR as being a 
‘particularly sensitive sea area’ (PSSA) (IMO, 2006c).  As commented on in 
Chapter Five one of the crucial aspects that the IMO consider for PSSAs is the 
ecological uniqueness and vulnerability of the area.  Therefore, it appears that the 
IMO deem the PKIMR as being ‘critical natural capital’ as explained under the 
Sustainability Imperative in Chapter Two.  Consequently for the IMO to ensure 
the sustainability of the PKIMR economic issues, such as the inconvenience to the 
shipping industry to sail east of the islands, was reduced in importance.  It was 
noted in Chapter Four that the marine reserve could be expected to be an area of 
‘significant conservation value’ and thereby certain activities around the marine 
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reserve would become ‘restricted coastal activities’ through the authority of the 
Minister of Conservation.  In Chapter Five however, it was discovered that if the 
Minister had imposed an RCA on the area surrounding the PKIMR, then it would 
have only applied to New Zealand ships.  For any maritime legislation to be 
applicable to all vessels it must be approved by an international body, such as the 
IMO (MSA, 2001).         
 
6.2.2 PKIMR and the Jody F Millennium Contrast  
 
Clearly the PKIMR is an outstanding marine environment, but during the 
development of the MATBA submission to the IMO, the MSA also investigated 
other coastal areas for possible classification by the IMO as ‘areas to be avoided’.  
Under this survey, although there were many coastal areas that had certain aspects 
that New Zealand classes as ‘significant’ or ‘special’, none met all the criteria set 
by the IMO.  Thus, the Gisborne coastline and harbour did not meet the 
international standard of PSSA and as such is not considered ‘critical natural 
capital’.  There are several reasons for this.  Firstly, although the deltas of the 
Taruheru and Turanganui Rivers were judged as vulnerable areas by the MSA 
when cleaning-up the JFM oil spill, the CMA in general is not an area of 
ecological rarity.  Secondly, whereas Northland’s eastern coastal waters has 
considerable vessel traffic, thereby increasing the PKIMR’s susceptibility to an oil 
spill, the CMA off Gisborne is far less exposed to the same threat or actuality.   
Another PSSA standard is one of socio-economic attributes.  For Northland the 
PKIMR generates an economy for the region through the tourism and diving 
operations to the reserve and the Islands are of great cultural significance to the 
Ngati Wai people.  In contrast, although the knowledge here is partial, the 
Gisborne CMA does not give the impression of being a ‘must do’ tourist 
destination.  Further to this while the desk-top review was not as detailed as the 
major case study, in no report of the JFM oil spill or clean-up was any river or 
beach singled out as having considerable cultural value.  However, despite the fact 
that the Gisborne CMA is not a candidate for PSSA or an area of ‘significant 
conservation value’ the JFM oil spill still damaged the flora and fauna of the 
beaches and coastal waters. 
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6.2.3 The JFM Grounding  
 
Under the JFM review in Chapter Five, Captain Ian Cook, a former Harbour 
Master at the Port of Gisborne, rejected the MSA’s findings of the JFM grounding 
in 2003.  The MSA put the main cause of the grounding down to the extreme 
weather conditions at the time.  Captain Cook stated that it was the decision to 
have the JFM leave the port that ensured the ‘accident’.  From subsequent 
information gathered it emerged that both the MSA and Captain Cook were 
accurate in their statements.  Price (2006, (pers. com.)) supports the MSA’s 
Accident Report that it was mainly the excessive weather conditions that was the 
driving influence for the decision to have the JFM leave the port.  However the 
assessment of the situation, throughout the day, as well as other grounds 
compounded the judgment that the vessel would be safer at sea.  These reasons 
range from;  
 
• No Harbour Master on duty; and 
• Lack of up-to-date weather data available to the Pilot, due to the Gisborne 
District Council (part owner of the port and the receptor of the weather 
forecasts) being closed for Waitangi Day; and  
• Misinformation provided to the Pilot regarding the lack of mooring ropes 
(this was incorrect) after five had broken from the JFM; and  
• The tugs at Gisborne Port were not ‘big’ enough to keep the JFM at the 
berth; and  
• The timing of the Pilot disembarking from the JFM, which ensured the 
vessel was travelling slower than it should have been in sea swells of 
around eight metres (Price, 2006 (pers. com.)). 
 
Additionally, Price (2006, (pers. com.)) stated that “there were suspicions held at 
the time … [by Port of Gisborne staff] that the depth in the entrance to the harbour 
was erroneous - that there was less water than chartred”.  As the vessel became 
grounded on leaving the entrance to the harbour the lack of UKC could be 
attributed to ‘less water’ in the channel.  This implies that there was no recent 
bathymetric15 survey existing for the Pilot to make reliable calculations of the 
                                                 
15 “Bathymetry is the measurement of the depths of water bodies from the water surface … [and 
is] the marine equivalent to topography” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2006).  
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UKC necessary for the JFM to have a clear passage out.  Thus, the final consensus 
of why the JFM went aground are the gale force winds and heavy swell at the 
time, compounded by human error and inexperience.  It is interesting to note 
however, that apart from the actual weather conditions all the other reasons 
highlight a lack of resources for essential services that a port should offer.  This is 
why when the owners of the JFM (Twin Bright Shipping Co. and Soki Kisen Co.) 
received the $23 million bill for damages, of which $2.9 million was paid to the 
MSA for the clean-up operation, they sued the co-owners of the Port of Gisborne 
(Gisborne District Council and Tauwhareparae Farms Ltd formerly Port of 
Gisborne).  The owners of the JFM were unsuccessful in their civil claim. 
 
6.3 Response to Objective One and Two   
 
6.3.1 Civil Liability for Oil Spill Pollution from Ships   
 
As both the oil spills reviewed in this thesis were from commercial vessels and 
not oil tankers their owners had to pay the full costs of the environmental damage 
caused by the oil spills.  In contrast, to cover the costs of oil spills in the marine 
environment the oil industry pay into two MEAs the CLC 1969 and Fund 
Convention 1971 that have been in force for over 35 years.  A year prior to the 
CLC however, a number of tanker owners had already initiated two voluntary 
funds (TOVALOP and CRISTAL) for the specific purpose of covering their 
liability in the case of an oil spill.  Even though the CLC and Fund Convention 
were instigated by the UN only a year or two after the voluntary schemes, to hold 
the oil industry accountable for oil spills, the voluntary funds continued as 
supplementary funding and they did not cease until 1997, 29 years later.  This 
suggests that some oil tanker owners had acknowledged their responsibility not 
only towards the environment, but also to the affected communities who often lost 
their livelihoods because of the oil pollution.  For other members of the oil 
industry, it took close to thirty years to either accept, or be forced to accept, the 
conditions of and contribute to the CLC and Fund Convention.  New Zealand is a 
member to both the CLC and Fund Convention, but as the MEAs are there to 
compensate a country once an oil spill has occurred New Zealand initiated the Oil 
Pollution Levy (OPL).   This levy “is collected from the risk creating sectors of 
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the maritime industry … to maintain the Oil Pollution Fund (OPF)” (MSA, 2006 
21).  The ‘risk creating sectors’ are the shipping and fishing industries and oil 
exploration and production industries.  The rate of payment is proportional to the 
threat that they generate to the environment.  The OPF supports the MSA in 
training personnel, maintaining and/or upgrading equipment to respond to oil 
spills and in paying the costs of damage when the spiller is unable to be identified 
(MSA, 2006b). 
 
This demonstrates that New Zealand has also internalized part of the economic 
cost of marine pollution, as advocated by Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration 
1992, and has passed it on to maritime industries.  The Principle suggests that the 
‘polluter should bear the cost of the pollution’.  New Zealand however has taken a 
precautionary approach, advanced again through Agenda 21, and legislated (via 
the MTA) that most commercial maritime users pay in advance to maintain New 
Zealand’s marine oil spill preparedness and response capability.   
 
6.3.2 IMO Mandates   
 
The CLC and Fund Convention established the ‘internalization’ of the costs of 
marine oil pollution and thus the UN has been promoting this for many years 
through both hard and soft-law MEAs.  Under MARPOL 73/78, a Protocol that 
seeks prevention of marine pollution, it was identified that the oil tanker industry 
should also accept responsibility for the prevention of oil spills.  As a result, 
various amendments to MARPOL 73/78 have entered into force to either ban, 
regulate or enforce certain operational practices.  Possibly the most notable 
amendment was the regulation, enforced from 1993, that made it mandatory for 
new tankers of 5,000 DWT or more  to be fitted with double hulls.  
Supplementary to this amendment, the IMO in 2003 accelerated the ‘phasing-out’ 
of single hull tankers from 2007 to 2005 (IMO, 2004 3).  Therefore, all single 
hulled tankers should now be obsolete.  Mr Wetendorf, the Whangarei MSA ship 
inspector interviewed, stated that “reactions about the single-double hull tankers 
from the shipping industry were generally that it was a ‘good’ regulation”.  
Further to this he reported that          
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Several contacts within the shipping industry commented that the 
Europeans had become very strict on single hull tankers and that if … 
New Zealand didn't take the same approach all the single hull tankers 
would come down here.  I do a lot of tanker inspections at Marsden 
Point and interestingly the reverse has happened … we have seen 
nearly all brand-new double hulled tankers in New Zealand, so all the 
tankers we are inspecting are low risk because they are either on their 
maiden voyage or their second or third trip (Wetendorf, 2004 6).                               
 
Other amendments include the 1983 banning through MARPOL 73/78 of the 
carriage of oil in the vessel’s forepeak tank (as in the event of a collision this is 
the most vulnerable point of the ship) and the standardization of operational 
discharges of oil from ships under Annex I of MARPOL.  Since 1995 the IMO 
has ‘enhanced’ the inspection programme for tankers and bulk carriers aged five 
years or over (IMO, 2004 2-3).   The enhanced inspection programme was 
apparently functioning here as    Wetendorf (2004 3) pointed out that “there has 
always been a very stringent system in place in New Zealand to inspect foreign 
flagged ships … [and] inspections  are based on the legislation of SOLAS (safety 
of life at sea) and MARPOL 73/78 and the MTA”.   
 
From the above MEAs it could appear that there is a reluctance on the part of the 
oil industry to be accountable for marine oil pollution however the oil tanker 
owners voluntary agreements (TOVALOP and CRISTAL) and the more recent 
experience of New Zealand berthing mainly double hulled tankers, without 
government direction, demonstrates that changes in the operational practices of 
the oil transport industry are occurring.  Additionally the nearly universal 
acquiescence of the oil tankers and bulk liquid carriers, which trade in New 
Zealand waters, to voluntarily sail east of the PKIMR displays a possible shift in 
philosophy.  Probably explanations could include: 
 
• as noted above, other countries are strengthening their environmental laws 
to better protect their coastal waters and therefore oil transporters have to 
accept the new regulations if they want to trade in that country; or  
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• oil companies realize the power of consumers and understand that oil 
companies who cause ecological devastation through a spill, especially if 
it could have been avoided, may find themselves boycotted: or 
• the oil companies have learnt from previous major oil spills and are taking 
a more preventative approach to the transport of oil or all of the above. 
 
The same can not be said of a number of other commercial shipping companies.  
For instance the MV Rotoma a very old ship with an acknowledged problem 
(leaking stern gland) which needed to continually empty its bilges, did not 
maintain the oil-water separator or ensure that they only drained the bilges outside 
the territorial limit.  This example along with the evidence of previous oil spills at 
the PKIMR and other shipping ‘accidents’ that were due to equipment failure 
illustrate that maintenance on these older ships probably needs to be of better 
quality.  The attitude towards maintenance on vessels is as Wetendorf (2004 4) 
believes  
 
always a crewing issue … [there] are different philosophies, some 
shipping companies run with the minimum of crew… who concentrate 
on the cargo and do no maintenance … then after two years [they] put 
the vessel in dry dock [to fix all the problems] … while other 
companies employ more crew and maintain the vessel at sea.                                         
 
The foremost operational norm was endorsed by the owners of the MV Rotoma, 
as after two more trans-Tasman voyages the vessel was going into dry-dock for 
repairs.  In the final analysis though, this business practice cost the owners and 
managers of the ship over $219,000 jointly, caused environmental damage to the 
PKIMR and economic loss to some businesses in Whangarei. 
 
6.4 Integrated Coastal Management   
 
The oil spill clean-up at the PKIMR and the identification of the MV Rotoma as 
the oil spiller was mainly due to the cooperation between the MSA and the NRC 
and this collaboration is an element of what is termed Integrated Coastal 
Management (ICM).  In New Zealand the ICM is facilitated by the RMA.  The 
Act instigates a hierarchal system of government and provides structures that 
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amalgamate national, regional and local level decisions regarding the use of 
resources. 
 
Figure Five in Chapter Four illustrates the jurisdiction of several Ministries and 
regional councils and the Acts that they administer in New Zealand’s sovereign 
waters.  There are however two specific statutory interconnections between 
regional councils and the MSA in the territorial sea with regard to oil spill 
response and enforcement.  Firstly, for the enforcement of ‘marine protection 
provisions’ the legislative framework is divided between the RMA and the MTA.  
Under these two Acts the marine protection provisions are extended by the 
Resource Management (Marine Protection) Regulations 1998 of the RMA (within 
the 12nm limit) and the marine protection rules in the MTA (EEZ).  Through 
these provisions the authority for actions such as clean-up, collection of evidence, 
prosecution and cost recovery are either held solely or jointly by the MSA and 
regional council.  The other legislative connection is set out in Part XXIII of the 
MTA, whereby the requirements of regional councils include “prepare and 
maintain regional oil spill contingency plans … appoint regional on-scene 
commanders … [and] respond to marine oil spills of regional significance …” 
(MSA, 2006c 3-7).  The interconnection between regional councils and the MSA 
can be more than just a statutory obligation, an integrated unit can be formed.  
This integration was apparent in Northland with Mr Niblock, who in 2004 was 
employed by the NRC as the Harbour Master and manager of the Oil Spill 
Response Team and was also the National On-Scene Commander for major oil 
spills at the time. 
 
Though many of the statutes, plans and policies that focus on the marine 
environment are integrated, Rennie (1993) highlighted the lack of integration of 
fisheries into coastal management.  The presence of two separate statutory 
processes (the RMA and the MTA provisions) for oil spill management could be 
seen as indicating a lack of integration.  However, as the research has shown, the 
role of the regional council effectively integrates the respective responsibilities of 
the different Acts. 
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6.5 Chapter Summary   
 
The focal point of this chapter was to analyse the case studies in light of the 
earlier chapters on legislation.  Initially the influence of the international 
agreements of OILPOL and the London Convention, which New Zealand ratified 
in the early seventies, formed the basis for New Zealand’s proactive legislation, 
such as the Marine Pollution Act 1974, that prevents oil spills in our territorial 
waters.  These MEAs were followed by the regional Protocol of SPREP, 
UNCLOS III and MARPOL 73/78 that even though New Zealand did not ratify 
until the late nineties, certain annexes and regulations had been incorporated into 
the Maritime Transport Act 1994 and the 1994 amendments to the RMA thereby 
further strengthening New Zealand’s ability to protect the marine environment 
from oil spills.   
 
The PKIMR oil spill highlighted the area’s vulnerability to spills and set in 
motion the application to and appointment by the IMO of the first MATBA in the 
world.  This international recognition to ban all shipping from the area is the most 
protection that can be achieved and even though it is only a small part of New 
Zealand’s coastline, the shipping traffic is the busiest in New Zealand.   
 
Though the grounding of and subsequent oil spill from the JFM was mainly due to 
the gale force weather, the review drew attention to the lack of services and 
resources at the Port of Gisborne.  These include vital communication systems 
breaking down, disinformation, out-of-date bathymetric survey and inexperience.  
Although attempts were made to discover whether the recommendations put forth 
by the MSA in their Accident Report in 2003 were fulfilled, no knowledge of any 
subsequent action was garnered (Lane, 2006 (pers. com.)).  It is probable, given 
the selected small community of specialists and the incident’s high profile, that 
the lessons learnt from it have been applied to not only the Port of Gisborne but 
other ports around the country.   
 
The CLC and Fund Convention MEAs are basically an ‘insurance’ against future 
oil pollution damage that member governments do not have to pay.  The MEAs 
are funded by contributions from the oil industry and as such are an 
‘internalization’ of the costs of marine oil pollution to the oil industry.  The 
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private tanker owner’s voluntary funds (TOVALOP and CRISTAL) established 
before the CLC and Fund Convention continued to supplement the UN MEAs for 
the next three decades.  New Zealand, after signing the Rio Declaration and 
Agenda 21 in 1992 at the Earth Summit, implemented Principle 16 of the 
Declaration and the precautionary approach from Agenda 21 and through the 
MTA instigated the Oil Pollution Levy.  This levy, on most commercial maritime 
users, funds the Oil Pollution Fund which sustains the MSA’s preparedness and 
response capacity to marine oil spills.  Although this oil pollution levy and fund 
do not prevent oil spills, by maintaining the MSA’s response capability the 
damage caused by the spill may well be minimised through response and 
restoration activities.   MARPOL 73/78 also uses ‘internalization’ of the costs of 
oil pollution, but the focus is on prevention.  The Protocol enforced several 
changes to the oil transport industry’s operational practices, construction design of 
the tankers and enhanced port state controls through improvements to the ship 
inspection system.  As a party to MARPOL 73/78 any precautionary 
developments or amendments made to the Protocol lessens New Zealand’s risk to 
an oil spill. 
 
The assimilation of these various precautionary and preventive MEAs into New 
Zealand’s statutes has translated into the harmonizing of the ‘marine protection 
provisions’ between the RMA and MTA.  This uniting through legislation of two 
separate government agencies, to avert and combat oil pollution in the coastal 
marine area demonstrates that integrated coastal management is not only possible, 
but necessary for a fluid environment such as the oceans.   
 
Having presented an evaluation and critique of the international agreements and 
national legislation that relate to oil pollution and then analysing two ‘oil spill’ 
incidents the next chapter encapsulates the main conclusions from my research.   
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions   
 
The purpose of this thesis is to answer the research question of ‘How does New 
Zealand’s legislation prevent oil spills in its territorial waters?’  The first objective 
was to explore whether the cause of New Zealand’s marine oil spills are because 
of oil tanker/shipping companies’ business operations and/or ideology.  The 
second objective was to establish what governmental measures are in place to 
lessen the impact of an oil spill in New Zealand.  These two objectives were 
examined through the review and analysis of the international and national 
legislation and two case studies.   
 
7.1 Thesis Findings   
 
The main findings are presented here in relation to the two objectives set out 
above.  This leads to the findings regarding the original question. 
 
7.1.1 Objective One   
 
In response to the enquiry of whether the oil spills in the CMA are the result of 
the business practices or ideology of the tanker/shipping industry the impression 
from the two case studies and the knowledge gathered from the key informants is 
that there are mixed responses within the industry.  The oil industry, in New 
Zealand at least, appears to have taken all the necessary precautions to minimise 
the risk of an oil spill in the marine environment.  This conclusion has been drawn 
from the fact that they voluntarily went east of the PKIMR ten years prior to the 
MATBA being enforced and additionally they supported New Zealand’s 
application to the IMO for the MATBA.  Then when some European countries 
banned single hull tankers, the industry did not employ them to transport oil to our 
shores, which they could have done, but used mainly brand-new double hull 
tankers.  This demonstrates a change in both ideology and operational procedures.  
However, whether this philosophical shift in environmental and socio-economic 
values comes from within the oil industry or is the result of pressure from the 
IMO and other international environmental organisations can not be determined 
by this research.  Nevertheless, there are a number of members of the oil industry 
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that support social responsibility, evidenced by the supplementation of the CLC 
and Fund Convention schemes for close to three decades.        
 
The business practices and ideology of some other shipping companies however 
exhibit a far less stringent attitude to both the maintenance and/or management of 
their vessels or the parameters of New Zealand’s marine protection rules.   This 
was revealed by the equipment failure and non-compliance of ship standing orders 
on the MV Rotoma and the emptying of the bilges while still sailing in New 
Zealand’s territorial sea.   
 
7.1.2 Objective Two  
 
The purpose of ascertaining what governmental measures are in place to reduce 
the impacts of an oil spill in New Zealand was because accidents do happen and 
laws are broken.  Even though there may possibly have been a different outcome 
to the JFM incident, if a variety of other factors had not been ‘in play’ on that day, 
the grounding and resultant oil spill were accidental.  This is in sharp contrast to 
the MV Rotoma spill which was due to the vessel breaking the law as vessels 
should not empty their bilges inside territorial waters. 
 
Apart from the legislation, the main governmental measure to minimizing the 
ecological destruction from a spill is the Oil Pollution Fund managed by the MSA.  
This fund ensures the preparation and response capability of the MSA and 
regional councils to an oil spill incident.  The preparedness and competence of the 
MSA and Regional Councils (Northland and Gisborne) in the two oil spills 
ensured that both spills did minimal environmental damage and in the case of the 
PKIMR identified and successfully prosecuted the offender.   
 
7.1.3 Answer to the Research Question    
 
The answer to how New Zealand’s legislation prevents oil spills in our territorial 
waters needs to be considered in terms of different scales and spheres of action.   
At the international scale the government’s response is initially to and through its 
involvement with the United Nations.  This membership to an international body 
with the ‘obligation’ to ratify hard-law and sign soft-law MEAs provides New 
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Zealand with both benefits and responsibilities.  Even though the word 
responsibility suggests an economic imposition, in this case it represents the 
protection of New Zealand’s oceanic domain from oil pollution.  By 
implementing the international rules and regulations set down in the MEAs 
through national legislation, New Zealand can apply most provisions of the MEAs 
to all vessels. 
 
Clearly, the MATBA was one area where it was necessary to have IMO 
authorization as it involved the ‘free right of passage to the seas’ allowed to all 
vessels even inside a country’s EEZ.  Mostly though, the implementation of the 
regulations of MEAs such as OILPOL, UNCLOS III and MARPOL 73/78 allows 
New Zealand the right to enforce, through the RMA and MTA, standards that 
safeguard New Zealand’s maritime environment from oil spills.  Other legislative 
instruments include the NZCPS and RCPs however the main mechanism in 
preventing oil spills in our territorial sea is the meshing of regional councils with 
the MSA through the execution of the ‘maritime protection provisions’.  These 
‘provisions’ ensure that in the case of oil spill prevention New Zealand does 
integrate coastal management.      
 
7.2 Sustainable Development v Sustainable Imperative  
 
At the heart of Sustainable Development is the integration of economic, social and 
environmental concerns not only for the present generation, but also future 
generations.  However, as commented on in Chapter Two there are many 
variations to Sustainable Development.  Two economic models examined were 
Weak and Strong Sustainability.  The main difference between the two is that 
Weak Sustainability believes all resources (human, natural, built) are substitutable 
while Strong Sustainability declares that there are some natural resources that are 
non-substitutable (air, water, soil).  So even though Strong Sustainability is an 
economic model it can be more easily related to the Sustainability Imperative in 
that there is long-term uncertainty about some of the effects of humans on the 
environment and that possibly they cannot be reversed.  Where Sustainable 
Development places as much importance on the social and economic aspects of 
societies as it does environmental concerns, the Sustainable Imperative recognizes 
that humans are totally dependent on ‘nature’.  Therefore, we need to be more 
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cautious in our approach when undertaking activities that may harm the 
environment, especially if the harm is unknown, but also if the harm is known.   
New Zealand has acknowledged this precautionary approach, especially to oil 
spills in the marine environment for many years and it is a fundamental principle 
of the RMA and the basis of sustainable management with an ‘environmental 
effects-based’ planning structure.  This preventative attitude is also established 
through other statutes such as the MTA and implies a deep government 
commitment to protecting our oceanic domain.  
 
7.3 Research Limitations Revisited 
 
As with all research, there are limitations such as scope, size and time constraints.  
There are however specific limitations exclusive to this research.   The primary 
constraint was the inability to generalise the findings of the two case studies with 
other places, conversely though this is very good as it indicates there have been 
few significant oil spills in New Zealand’s territorial waters.  There have been 
several other small spills, such as the diesel leak in Fiordland in February 2004 
and some ‘near misses’ such as the Capella Voyager a crude oil tanker carrying 
over 107,000 tonnes that grounded in Whangarei Harbour in 2003, though no oil 
was lost.  New Zealand has only had one spill, the Jody F Millennium, which 
warranted mention in the international ‘oil spill’ statistics.  Less significant 
limitations were imposed with the data collection; key government agencies were 
unable to clarify apparently inconsistent and contradictory information, despite 
seeking confirmation from an international body, and relevant documentation had 
gone ‘missing’ and finally other data was unavailable due to still being in the 
finalisation stages.   The last restriction was the non-acquiescence of a key 
stakeholder to be interviewed, the owners and managers of the MV Rotoma, 
thereby not being able to gain a full understanding of their position.  Despite these 
constraints the methodology employed has enabled a rich appreciation of the 
issues, scale and contrasts between different types of oil spill response. 
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7.4 Guidelines for Future Research 
 
This research has shown that New Zealand has and does take a very proactive 
stance in protecting its marine environment from both the threat and reality of oil 
spills from vessels.  However, as with any research during the gathering of 
information and the exploration of the issues other avenues of interest can be 
created.  In the case of oil pollution in New Zealand’s territorial sea, future 
research that may further contribute to the safeguarding of our coastal marine area 
could include: 
 
• The multiple unknown oil spills at the PKIMR prior to the MATBA, 
suggests the need for improved monitoring elsewhere.  An investigation 
on what monitoring is done could offer further insight. 
 
• The International Maritime Organisation found that the Poor Knights 
Islands Marine Reserve was an area of “critical natural capital” and 
though no other marine area in New Zealand met all their criteria a review 
of what New Zealander’s think is “critical natural capital” or areas of 
“significant conservation value” in our own marine environment could 
possibly highlight areas that need more ‘protection’ than they receive 
now. 
 
• The main source of global oil pollution in the oceans is from land-based 
activities that drain into the sea.  Research into the quantity of indirect oil 
pollution that enters the coastal marine area and the government’s 
response to the problem would further enhance New Zealand’s proactive 
stance in combating oil pollution in the marine environment. 
 
• As sustainability appears to be a key goal of many nations and as our 
approach to prevent oil spills from vessels generally seems to work, there 
is the potential to explore or consider extending the New Zealand model 
to other nations within the socio-economic and political arena. 
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7.5 Final Comment   
 
Integrated coastal management has become progressively more important as 
maritime nations realize the growing pressures on the coastal area from economic, 
environment and social interests.  The findings of this research have confirmed 
that the management of both the prevention and rehabilitation of our territorial 
waters from ship oil spills is a combined effort between government agencies, that 
is effective, it is now time to look at the other sources of destruction and decay of 
our marine environment and jointly work together to ensure that our oceanic 
domain is preserved.                                         
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